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Acquiring in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal
Question Cases: Procedural Frustration Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
Marilyn J. Berger*
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of federal courts as enforcers of federally created law
recently has received renewed attention. Proposals to curtail diver-
sity jurisdiction, the elimination of the monetary requirement for
federal question cases and the proliferation of civil cases brought
in federal courts4 suggest a resurgence of the idea that the primary
function of federal courts is to entertain cases involving federally
granted rights. The interest in having federal forums hear federal
questions makes it particularly important for federal courts to ac-
quire personal jurisdiction in such cases.
The federal court system originally was established to provide
a national forum for the protection of federally granted rights.5 De-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law, B.S., 1965,
Cornell University, J.D., 1970, University of California at Berkeley.
The author wishes to acknowledge the inspiration and editorial assistance of Edith
Warkentine, associate at the law firm of Drummy, Garrett, King and Harrison; Gay Gell-
horn for excellent research and invaluable comments; and Professor Mark Reutlinger for his
special assistance.
1. Federal courts have jurisdiction over "[c]ases in Law and Equity, arising under [the
United States] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ... under
their Authority." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Those cases are termed federal question cases.
2. During the 95th Congress, several bills were introduced to curtail federal diversity
jurisdiction. The House Bill, passed on February 28, 1978, would have effectively abolished
diversity jurisdiction. H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1569-70 (1978). How-
ever, the Senate Bill proposing curtailment of diversity jurisdiction, S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-9 (1978), did not survive the
Senate Committee, and both bills died. See Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Posi-
tive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92 HAv. L. Ray. 963 (1979) (discuss-
ing proposals to abolish diversity jurisdiction).
3. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a),
94 Stat. 2369 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1981)).
4. Civil cases pending on June 30, 1960 numbered 61,251. On June 30, 1980 there were
186,113 cases pending-an increase of 203.9% during the twenty year period. See Avmis-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 55 table 13
(1980).
5. See 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MELLER & E. CooPEn, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3561 (1975); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L.
285
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spite that initial intent, Congress did not address federal question
subject matter jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789;6 with few
exceptions, the federal courts were not vested with original federal
question subject matter jurisdiction until 1875.7 Since granting
that jurisdiction, Congress has given scant attention to federal
court access for federal questions.8 Only when particular jurisdic-
tional problems are brought to its attention has Congress con-
cerned itself with personal jurisdiction in federal question cases.
As a result, a myriad of federal question personal jurisdiction stat-
utes have developed, not reflective of any uniform plan.10
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, Congress finally attempted to provide a uniform standard for
exercising personal jurisdiction in federal courts. Despite that at-
tempt, there is currently no uniform method for acquiring personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases. A contributing factor to the
lack of uniformity is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.11
Rule 4 governs the assertion of personal jurisdiction in most
civil actions brought in federal court.1 2 Under Rule 4, the exercise
REv. 639 (1942).
6. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. Among other things, the Judiciary Act created inferior federal
courts, removal jurisdiction, the jurisdictional amount requirement for diversity subject
matter jurisdiction, the Rules of Decision Act and Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.
7. See Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). In analyzing the debates on the 1789 Act, Warren concluded that
the final form of the Act was a compromise measure to secure the votes of those who "were
willing to see the experiment of a Federal Constitution" and "were insistent that the Fed-
eral courts be given minimum powers and jurisdiction." Id. at 53. He observed that drafting
the bill was a contest between those "who wished to confine federal judicial power within
narrow limits. . . and those who wished to vest in the Federal Courts the full judicial power
[of the constitution]." Id. at 62.
For a description of the federal questions that could be entertained by federal courts
prior to 1875, see P. BATOR, P. MISCHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 844-47 (2d ed. 1973). Those questions were heard because of their
peculiarly federal nature or political exigencies. Id. at 844.
8. With the exception of a one-year experiment that vested federal courts with original
federal question subject matter jurisdiction, Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89,
repealed by Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, Congress did not grant federal courts
such jurisdiction until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. IV 1980)).
9. Congress' limited attention to the desirability of federal jurisdiction for federal
questions parallels the attitude of the framers of the 1875 Act. Professors Chadbourn and
Levin have observed that the 1875 Act, which granted federal courts original jurisdiction
over federal questions, was not the result of any extended debate or discussion. Chadbourn
and Levin, supra note 4, at 643-45.
10. See infra notes 159-227 and accompanying text.
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 4. For the text of Rule 4, see infra note 17.
12. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "These rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cogniza-
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of personal jurisdiction involves two primary requirements: (1) no-
tice, which refers to the mechanics for serving process; and (2)
amenability, which refers to the relationship between the defen-
dant and the forum. Although the Rule describes the mechanics
for service of process, it does not clarify the amenability basis,'5
specifying only that process may be served pursuant to its own
provisions or by compliance with applicable state or federal stat-
utes. Neither the language of the Rule nor the Advisory Committee
notes provide sufficient guidance for determining which of those
three methods for serving process can and should be used as a ba-
sis for asserting jurisdiction or what the constitutional limits are.
Federal courts addressing the amenability issue have devel-
oped their own responses. In the absence of explicit jurisdictional
statutes for many federal questions, federal courts rely on state
statutes. Applying state jurisdictional principles, some federal
courts have used the due process test developed by the United
States Supreme Court in International Shoe v. Washington.14
Others, recognizing that federal and state forums differ, have sug-
gested that a federal due process test is more appropriate.15 Still
others have indicated that use of the federal transfer of venue stat-
ute is a logical way to resolve problems of asserting personal juris-
diction in federal courts.' 6
Contrary to its purported intent, Rule 4 is an obstacle to uni-
formity in acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal question cases.
Current solutions posed by Congress and the federal courts have
not resolved the problems created by the lack of consistency.
This article calls for a uniform personal jurisdiction standard
in federal question cases. In so doing, it examines the three ways to
acquire personal jurisdiction under Rule 4 and evaluates the ade-
quacy of each method. Because some federal courts rely on the
personal jurisdiction analysis developed for state courts, this arti-
cle explores the recent United States Supreme Court cases in that
area. Finally, it explains the principles of due process developed by
federal courts and examines their applicability to the exercise of
jurisdiction in federal question cases.
ble as cases at law or in equity, or in admiralty. .. ."Id. 1.
13. Throughout this article, the phrases "basis for asserting jurisdiction" and "amena-
bility basis" are used interchangeably.
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See infra note 32.
15. See infra notes 135-152 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 73-76, 153-154 and accompanying text.
No. 21 287
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II. RULE 4
A. Physical Presence as a Basis for Asserting Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 417 fails to enumerate explic-
17. The applicable provisions of Rule 4 are:
(d) Summons: Personal Service. The summons and complaint shall be served to-
gether. The plaintiff shall furnish the person making service with such copies as are
necessary. Service shall be made as follows:
(1) Upon an individual other than an infant or an incompetent person, by de-
livering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to him personally or by
leaving copies thereof at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a
copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appoint-
ment or by law to receive service of process.
(2) Upon an infant or an incompetent person, by serving the summons and
complaint in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the service
is made for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defen-
dant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or other un-
incorporated association which is subject to suit under a common name, by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a manag-
ing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute
to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant.
(4) Upon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is
brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee desig-
nated by the United States attorney in writing filed with the clerk of the court
and by sending.a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or
certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington,
District of Columbia, and in any action attacking the validity of an order of an
officer or agency of the United States not made a party, by also sending a copy
of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to such
officer or agency.
(5) Upon an officer or agency of the United States, by serving the United
States and by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to such
officer or agency. If the agency is a corporation the copy shall be delivered as
provided in paragraph (3) of this subdivision of this rule.
(6) Upon a state or municipal corporation or other governmental organization
thereof subject to suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to the chief executive officer thereof or by serving the summons and
complaint in the manner prescribed by the law of that state for the service of
summons or other like process upon any such defendant.
(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this
subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and complaint are
served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the United States or in the
manner prescribed by the law of the state in which the district court is held for
the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant in an
action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of that state.
(e) Same: Service Upon Party Not Inhabitant of or Found Within State. Whenever a
statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of
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itly a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction. Therefore, many au-
thorities take the position that the Rule does no more than provide
methods for serving process,"" and many federal courts have taken
a similar position.19
summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court is held, service may
be made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by the statute or
order, or, if there is no provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a man-
ner stated in this rule. Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the
district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an
order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state,
or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action
by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located
within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances and in
the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
(f) Territorial Limits of Effective Service. All process other than a subpoena may be
served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is
held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by these rules, be-
yond the territorial limits of that state. In addition, persons who are brought in as
parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties to a pending action or a counter-
claim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated
in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state but
within the United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which
the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial; and per-
sons required to respond to an order of commitment for civil contempt may be served
at the same places. A subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in
Rule 45.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)-(f).
18. The overwhelming weight of authority interprets Rule 4 as describing only the
mechanics for serving process. See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT, A. MLLER & E. COOPER, supra note 4,
§§ 1063-64, 1117:
Strictly speaking Rule 4 does not deal directly with jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter, jurisdiction over the person, or venue. The federal rules were not designed to
affect jurisdiction or venue, and this is expressly stated in Rule 82 ....
The primary function of Rule 4 is to provide the mechanisms for bringing notice
of the commencement of an action to defendant's attention and to provide a ritual
that marks the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Normally this is ac-
complished by service of a summons and complaint on defendant or the attachment
of his property pursuant to the procedures set out in Rule 4.
Id. § 1063, at 204. See also 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTcE. 14.25[7], at 4-282 n.9 (2d ed.
1981); Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (pt. 1), 77
HARv. L. REV. 601 (1964). Contra Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969
Wis. L. REv. 9, 16-17 n.28.
19. E.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Stanley v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F.
Supp. 1267, 1269 (N.D. Ga. 1973). Cf. Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405
F.2d 250, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1968) (interpreting Rule 4 as addressing both manner of service
and amenability). The principal case cited for the proposition that Rule 4(d)(3) does not
prbvide an amenability basis is Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223-31 (2d
Cir. 1963), which held that in a diversity action, corporate presence, and therefore amenabil-
ity to process, should be determined by state law. The court of appeals rejected the inter-
pretation that Rule 4(d)(3) provides a federal amenability basis for foreign corporations,
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This section explores the possibility that Rule 4 authorizes the
assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of physical presence. 20 Exami-
basing its reasoning on three arguments: (1) federal statutes or rules of civil procedure do
not expressly authorize such an interpretation; (2) interpreting Rule 4(d)(3) as providing a
federal amenability basis strains the particular language of that rule; and (3) the notes of
the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rule indicate that its limited purpose is to regu-
late the manner for service. The Arrowsmith court, however, failed to address the argument
advanced three years earlier in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.
1960). In Jaftex, the majority concluded that because Rule 4(d)(3) was based in part on the
1789 Judiciary Act, which determined amenability to jurisdiction under federal standards, it
should be interpreted as providing an amenability basis. 282 F.2d at 512, 516. Judge Clark,
who authored the majority opinion in Jaftex, dissented in Arrowsmith. In his dissent, Judge
Clark questioned the retreat from Jaftex and warned against the inherent confusion and
limitations of applying state law. 320 F.2d at 234-42, 242 app. (Clark, J., dissenting).
Judge Clark's argument in Jaftex might have been more persuasive had he compared
the language of Rule 4 with that of the 1789 Judiciary Act because there are striking simi-
larities. For a discussion of the language and interpretation of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see
infra notes 159-186 and accompanying text. See also Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of
Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 109 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Stanley v. Local 926,
Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1269 (N.D. Ga. 1973). But see Coleman
v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 251-53 (2d Cir. 1968).
20. The physical presence basis received its best known publication in Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Historically, each state was considered to be a sovereign entity and
only could assert jurisdiction over a defendant found and served within its geographic
boundaries. The basis for jurisdiction became known as transient presence because it did
not matter how transient a defendant's presence within the state was for process to be effec-
tive. Transient presence has been referred to as a common law basis for the assertion of
jurisdiction. 1 J. BE ALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 339-40 (1935). But see Ehrenzweig, The Tran-
sient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289 (1956).
Generally, the physical presence basis operates differently for corporations than for nat-
ural persons. At the time of Pennoyer, it generally was believed that corporations only ex-
isted where they were incorporated. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 517
(1839). Subsequently, the doctrine of implied consent was devised to allow states to assert
jurisdiction over a corporation engaged in activities outside the state of its incorporation. By
doing business within a state, a corporation was deemed to have given implied consent to
that state's jurisdiction. To be consistent with the physical presence doctrine for individu-
als, courts required appointment of a corporate agent within the state for service of process.
The corporation then was deemed present and served within the state through its agent.
There were objections to the "consent" doctrine because of its fictitious nature. See
Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe, Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented
Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REv. 565, 575-77 (1979). Courts responded by adopting the
"doing business test," which deemed the corporation "present" because of its activities
within the state. See International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914). The
"doing business" approach is considered by most commentators to be the analogue of
"physical presence." See Werner, supra, at 577. That conclusion, however, fails to account
for certain fundamental differences between the two bases. First, unlike physical presence,
"doing business" was not generally recognized as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction at com-
mon law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 35 comment f (1971). Second,
under the doing business basis, a corporation's presence, unlik* the physical presence basis
for individuals, could not be of a transient nature. See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 441 (1952). Third, a corporation's presence now is measured by its activi-
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nation of the Rule suggests, however, that the use of physical pres-
ence as a basis for acquiring jurisdiction is limited by geographic
scope, judicial interpretation and application of due process
principles.
Construing Rule 4 as providing for presence as an amenability
basis requires that the language describing the methods for service
of process be interpreted as also providing a basis for asserting
personal jurisdiction.21 Under Rule 4, the method of service de-
pends on whether or not process is served within the territorial
boundaries of the state in which the district court is located.2 2 Ser-
vice made within the court's geographic boundaries can be accom-
plished under Rule 423 or under an applicable state2 4 or federal
statute.2 If a party physically present within the district* court's
territorial boundaries is served pursuant to Rule 4, subsections
(d)(1)-(6) and (f) specify the manner of service.26
Unless an amenability basis is provided either in a statute or
by common law, jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a party.27
ties in the state, not merely by an agent served within the state. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17 (1945).
21. One commentator has suggested that where jurisdiction in a federal question case
is predicated on a defendant's physical presence within the state in which the district court
is located, "it is generally assumed that judicially-fashioned federal standards of "consent"
or "presence" measure the amenability of the defendant within the state where the district
court is held, and thus provide options of federal as well as state standards of amenability
when service is made within the state." Foster, supra note 18, at 17 (footnote omitted).
In Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976), the defendant was person-
ally served with process while present in the state in which the district court was located, as
specified by Rule 4(d)(1). The district court held that "filt has long been black letter law
that personal service within its geographical area establishes a court's personal jurisdiction
over the defendant." Id. at 420. See also Koupetoris v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d
1392, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976) (service of process pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3) resulting in amenabil-
ity to personal jurisdiction). Cf. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553 n.5 (1980) (Stewart &
Brennan, JJ., dissenting on other grounds) (statute appearing only to provide for manner of
serving process interpreted as detailing amenability for personal jurisdiction). In Stafford,
Justices Stewart and Brennan stated that "as a general rule, service of process is the means
by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Id.
22. Rules 4(d)(1)-(6) and 4(f) specify how service can be made within a federal court's
geographic boundaries. Rules 4(e) and (i) specify how service can be made outside the
court's boundaries.
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (3), (4)-(6), (f).
24. See id. 4(d)(2), (7) (service can be made pursuant to an applicable state statute for
those persons or entities described in Rule 4(d)(1)-(3)).
25. See id. 4(d)(7),(f) (service of process pursuant to a federal statute authorized for
those persons or entitites described in Rules 4(d)(1) or (3)).
26. But see Rule 4(d)(2) (manner for serving process on infants and incompetents is
that prescribed by state statute).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 20, § 79 introductory
note & comment c, at 101-02; RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 7 comment (Tent.
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Therefore, Rule 4 should either specify an amenability basis or
designate the source from which the amenability basis can be de-
rived. The Rule, however, does neither. Because some standard of
amenability is necessary and the common law physical presence
basis need not be codified, 8 it is appropriate to construe Rule 4 as
including physical presence as the amenability basis where it de-
scribes the federal manner for serving process.
That interpretation of Rule 4 is supported by subsections (e)
and (i). Rule 4(e), which governs service on a defendant not an
inhabitant of or found within the state in which the district court
is located, and Rule 4(i), which provides for service in a foreign
country, declare that either applicable state or federal statutes
may be followed in determining the method of service. Although
neither section contains an explicit provision dealing with amena-
bility to jurisdiction, federal courts interpreting those sections
have impliedly determined that the amenability basis is provided
by state or federal statutes." Under that interpretation, the ame-
nability basis can be provided by a separate statute or by Rule 4,
Draft No. 5, 1978).
28. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 93 (1971): "Some of
the bases for jurisdiction over individuals have been recognized at common law without the
need for a statute authorizing use of those bases for jurisdiction. These 'common law' bases
are presence, consent and appearance." Id. (footnote omitted).
Construing Rule 4 as providing for presence as the amenability basis also is consistent
with the construction given to similar state statutes. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 301
(McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1981): "A court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, prop-
erty, or status as might have been exercised heretofore." That statute has been interpreted
as preserving the common law bases for jurisdiction. See also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973). The California Judicial Council commented that Section 410.10 "permits Cali-
fornia courts to exercise judicial jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the state or
federal Constitutions. This authorization continues the California law on jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and re-establishes the prior law that once governed nonresident indi-
viduals." Id. comment-judicial council, at 459. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(1) (Supp.
1981): "A court of this State having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over a
person [i]n any action... in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of
process is made upon such party: (a) [i]s a natural person present within this State." See
also CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 415-417 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, §§
13-19 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1981); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 307-312 (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j) (Supp. 1981).
29. In Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1965), the court of
appeals commented that because no federal statutory provision informs courts when foreign
corporations are amenable to jurisdiction, the amenability basis is found within the state
long-arm statute used to effect service of process. In Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974), the question of amenability for service under the state
long-arm statute was governed by state interpretation, even though the trademark infringe-
ment action arose under federal law. The same conclusion has been reached where service of
process was made pursuant to a federal statute. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980);
supra note 21.
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which also is a federal statute. Similarly, in the case of Rule
4(d)(1)-(6) where no reference to a separate statute is made, the
physical presence language for service of process can be construed
as providing the amenability basis.
B. Nonuniform Treatment Under Rule 4
1. Application of State Due Process Principles-Because of
the difficulties in determining an amenability basis, it is not sur-
prising that federal courts have adopted different approaches to
acquiring personal jurisdiction under Rule 4. In particular, federal
courts have given diverse interpretations to subsections (d)(1)-(6)
and (f). To a great extent, that lack of uniformity is a result of
attempts to apply jurisdictional principles developed for state
courts to questions of federal jurisdiction.
State courts analyze jurisdictional disputes by determining
whether the defendant is physically within the state's territorial
boundaries.30 Where a defendant is served with process while he is
within the state's boundaries, the state can assert jurisdiction
based on that presence.3 1 If a defendant is physically outside the
state, a due process test must be met before the state may exercise
jurisdiction. 2
Where service of process is made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1)-(6),
some federal courts accept physical presence as the amenability
basis.3 3 Under Rule 4(d)(1)-(6), the geographic boundaries of the
30. State statutes usually differentiate between defendants who are physically located
within the state's boundaries and those outside the state. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110,
§§ 13-19 (Smith-Hurd 1968 & Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (Supp. 1981).
31. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A.
714, 715 (1895); Darrah v. Watson, 36 Iowa 116, 121 (1872); Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass.
217, 220 (1870); Barrell v. Benjamin, 15 Mass. 354 (1819).
32. The due process test applied by state courts is commonly referred to as the "mini-
mum contacts test." That test first was articulated in International Shoe Co. v. Wasington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the Court determined that to assert personal
jurisdiction over a corporation not present within the state, fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess standards had to be met:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of sum-
mons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
33. Physical presence as an amenability basis was recognized in Donald Manter Co. v.
Davis, 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976), where service of process apparently was made pursuant
to Rule 4(d)(1). See also Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio. R.R., 212 F.2d
147, 151-55 (5th Cir. 1954) (recognizing a federal basis for asserting personal jurisdiction
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federal court are coterminous with those of the state in which the
district court is located.3 ' Therefore, when a defendant is within
those boundaries, the federal district court can assert jurisdiction
over the defendant in the same manner as state courts.
Under Rule 4(f),"5 the boundaries of federal district courts are
extended an additional 100 miles for service of process on neces-
sary or third parties. Where a third party defendant is served with
process while within the geographic boundaries of the "100 mile
bulge" area,3e however, only a minority of federal courts allow the
assertion of personal jurisdiction based on physical presence
alone. 7 The majority of federal courts apply a due process test,"
which is the result of two factors: reliance on state court jurisdic-
tional principles and a misinterpretation of the territorial bounda-
ries of district courts.
State jurisdictional principles require a due process analysis if
a defendant is outside a state's boundaries.3 9 Because its bounda-
ries are clearly definable, a state court easily can decide whether a
due process test is appropriate. Most federal courts and commen-
where service of process was made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3)). Cf. First Flight Co. v. National
Car-loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). In First Flight, service of process
was made pursuant to Rule 4(d)(3) on a third party defendant's corporate agent within the
territorial limits of the district court. Although not directly stating that the basis for assert-
ing personal jurisdiction was physical presence, the court observed that "a sovereignty has
personal jurisdiction over any defendant within its territorial limits." Id. at 736.
34. See supra note 17.
35. Rule 4() provides in relevant part
[P]ersons who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as additional parties
to a pending action or a counterclaim or cross-claim therein pursuant to Rule 19, may
be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of subdivision (d) of this rule at
all places outside the state but within the United States that are not more than 100
miles from the place in which the action is commenced, or to which it is assigned or
transferred for trial ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 4().
36. The territory described by Rule 4(f) is called the "100 mile bulge area" because it
allows process to be served beyond the boundaries of the state where the district court is
located.
37. See, e.g., Deloro Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Engelhard Minerals & Chems. Corp., 313
F. Supp. 470 (D.N.J. 1970) (diversity); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 270 F. Supp. 887
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (diversity). Cf. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959)
(defendant personally served with process under Rule 4() while flying over Arkansas was
physically within the territorial limits of the state).
38. See, e.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d
Cir. 1968) (federal question); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (federal question); Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63 (D.
Md. 1969) (diversity); McGonigle v. Penn-Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58 (D. Md. 1969)
(federal question).
39. See supra note 32.
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tators view the "100 mile bulge" area as extraterritorial. ° Where a
defendant is served with process while physically present in the
"100 mile bulge" area, those courts consider the defendant outside
the federal district court's territorial boundaries and then, by re-
ferring to state court jurisdictional principles, apply a due process
test."1 The problem with that approach is that Congress, in Rule
4(f), has redefined the territorial boundaries of district courts to
extend beyond the boundaries of the state in which the federal dis-
trict court is located for the purpose of serving process on neces-
sary or third parties. 2 The geographic extension of federal district
court boundaries does not make assertion of jurisdiction within the
extended area extraterritorial. Because a federal district court can
assert jurisdiction over a defendant within its geographic area
based on physical presence alone, a due process test should be un-
necessary where personal service is made on a third party defen-
dant within the "100 mile bulge" area.' 3
40. E.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 250, 251 (2d
Cir. 1968); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
McGonigle v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 61 (D. Md. 1969); Karlsen v. Hanff,
278 F. Supp. 864, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). But see Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412 (5th
Cir. 1979). In Sprow, the court believed that the 100-mile bulge provision "has- effectively
expanded the territorial jurisdiction of a federal district court beyond state lines." Id. at
416. Although the Sprow court recognized that Rule 4(f) "was an exercise by Congress of its
lawful power to provide for service of process in any part of the United States," it neverthe-
less applied principles of due process. Id. The court justified that application by reasoning:
[I]t is possible that a set of facts may arise where it would be fundamentally unfair to
subject a party served within the bulge area to the forum's jurisdiction. The clearest
example that comes to mind is that of a corporation whose only contact with the
forum state or bulge area is its officer's temporary presence within the bulge at the
time of service.
41. E.g., Coleman v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 251-52 (2d Cir.
1968); Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
McGonigle v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 63 (D. Md. 1969); Karlsen v. Hanff,
278 F. Supp. 864, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49
F.R.D. 63, 66 (D. Ml. 1969) (assuming, without holding, that due process requirements
apply).
42. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1945). In Mississippi
Publishing, the court stated that "Rule 4(f) serves only to implement the jurisdiction over
the subject matter which Congress has conferred, by providing a procedure by which the
defendant may be brought into court at the places where Congress has declared that the suit
may be maintained." Id. at 445.
43. But see Kaplan, supra note 18, at 633: "The amendment is certainly not intended
to hold the corporation to judgment if the sole contact is the fact of service. Considerations
of fairness to the party, viewed in the light of the animating purpose of the amendment,
ought to control. . . ." Notwithstanding Professor Kaplan's concerns, a due process test is
not essential to ensure fairness in asserting personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. A
corporation's presence is measured by its activities. Similarly with individuals, although
they are "present" if physically served with process while within the geographic area, the
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2. Lack of Uniformity Within the Due Process Test-A sec-
ond problem of uniformity under Rule 4(f) occurs because federal
courts apply state court standards to determine whether due pro-
cess has been satisfied. The due process test used by state courts is
the "minimum contacts" test,4 which determines the sufficiency of
a defendant's contacts with a particular state. 5 Federal courts also
use a minimum contacts approach to due process, examining the
sufficiency of a defendant's contacts with a defined geographic
area."6 In federal courts, however, the geographic entity with which
the sufficiency of the defendant's contacts is measured varies. Fed-
eral courts examine the defendant's contacts with one of three geo-
graphic areas: (1) the forum state, (2) the bulge area (the 100 miles
in which the third-party defendant may be served) or (3) the
United States.
In Karlsen v. Hanf,'47 the third-party defendant in an admi-
ralty case was served with process, pursuant to Rule 4(f), in the
bulge area. Adopting state minimum contacts analysis and territo-
rial limitations, the Karlsen court selected the state in which the
district court was located as the geographic entity with which to
measure the defendant's contacts.48 Thus, the court found that it
could not assert jurisdiction because process was served beyond
the state's boundaries.
Other courts examine the sufficiency of the defendant's con-
tacts with the bulge area.' 9 In Coleman v. American Export Is-
federal question provides a sufficient connection to the federal forum to ensure fairness.
44. See supra note 32.
45. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977); Kurland, The Supreme Court,
the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer
to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569, 623 (1958). Professor Kurland suggests that
the constitutional standard used to determine the sufficiency of compliance with due process
should reflect considerations of fairness to the defendant rather than territorial considera-
tions. Id.
46. See McGonigle v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 63 (D. Md. 1969):
"[T]he appropriate inquiry would appear to be what contacts the person served has had
with that territorial unit."
47. 278 F. Supp. 864, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
48. Id. In reaching that conclusion, the court stated: "Rule 4 deals only with service
and does not affect amenability to suit. To hold otherwise herein would fly in the face of the
Supreme Court's decision in Hanson v. Denckla ... which requires certain minimal con-
tacts with the forum in order to subject a defendant to in personam jurisdiction." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
49. See, e.g., Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416 (5th Cir. 1979) (defining
the appropriate due process rule as either contacts with the forum state or in the bulge
area).
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brandtsen Lines, Inc.,50 also a case in admiralty, the district court
rejected examination of contacts with the forum state alone and
suggested that the third-party defendant must have minimum con-
tacts with the bulge area.51 A majority of federal courts follow
Coleman, reasoning that if the defendant's contacts were measured
solely by references to a forum state's boundaries, susceptibility to
jurisdiction under the "100 mile bulge" rule would not be much
different than under state long-arm statutes.52
Some commentators have suggested that the United States is
a more appropriate geographic area with which to examine the suf-
ficiency of a defendant's contacts than either the forum or the
bulge area.' Because jurisdiction relates to the power of the unit
of government of which that court is a part,"M and not to a particu-
lar court's power, use of the United States as the geographic entity
is more logical under a territorial due process test.5 Nevertheless,
most federal courts have not adopted that approach.56
The different approaches adopted by federal courts illustrate
the problems inherent in applying a territorial due process test.
50. 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
51. Id. at 252.
52. See, e.g., Spearing v. Manhattan Oil Transp. Corp., 375 F. Supp. 764, 771
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63, 67 (D. Md. 1969);
McGonigle v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 62 (D. Md. 1969). See also Kaplan,
supra note 18, at 629; Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts:
The 1963 Changes in Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1053, 1059-61 (1963).
53. See Note, The Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Under'Rule 4(f) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 268, 296 nn.238 & 297 (1980);
Comment, Return to the Twilight Zone-Federal Long-Arm Jurisdiction and Amenability
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f) Bulge Service of Process: Sprow v. Hartford Insur-
ance Co., 41 Omio ST. L.J. 685, 725 (1980).
54. See Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,
390 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (suggesting that sufficiency of defendant's contacts should be ex-
amined in relation to the United States). For a full discussion of the the Moriarty case and
its approach, see infra notes 134-138 and accompanying text.
55. Geographic areas have been used consistently to measure due process. For states,
that use has reflected the sovereign entity concept. The sovereign entity concept, however,
does not apply to federal court use of geographic areas. In particular, the 100-mile bulge
area does not correspond to a sovereign entity, such as the forum state or the state into
which the bulge area extends. Where territorial considerations are used in federal question
cases, it would be more relevant to require minimum contacts with the United States. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 27, §§ 8-10. But cf. National Equip.
Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 330-31 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that
state boundary lines ought to be constitutionally controlling in diversity cases even when a
federal manner for serving process is used).
56. Courts have used the United States as the geographic entity, however, under na-
tionwide service of process statutes. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th
Cir. 1979) (sufficiency of defendant's contacts should be examined in relation to the United
States because that is the sovereign entity).
No. 2]
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Instead of creating a uniform system for asserting personal juris-
diction, federal courts' due process analyses have resulted in
nonuniformity. Lack of uniformity arguably could be eliminated if
physical presence were used as a basis for asserting personal juris-
diction in federal question cases.
C. Physical Presence and Due Process: Are They Antagonistic?
Uniformity could be achieved by adopting a consistent ap-
proach in interpreting Rule 4 and due process. For example, if
Rule 4 implicitly provides for physical presence as an amenability
basis, it is doubtful that a due process test needs to be applied in
federal question cases.5 7 Due process notions limit the power of a
court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant to situations where the assertion of jurisdiction is con-
sistent with principles of "fair play and substantial justice."8
Whether an assertion of jurisdiction meets those standards de-
pends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
Physical presence as a basis for exercising jurisdiction is based
on the "power theory. '59 According to that theory, "every State
possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory." 60 Thus, a sovereign derives the
57. Except to recognize that the concerns of federal and state courts may differ in
their approaches to jurisdiction, state court's application of due process principles, where
physical presence is the amenability basis, is beyond the scope of this article. For an exten-
sive discussion of state jurisdiction and physical presence, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 20;
Werner, supra note 20.
58. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See supra note 32.
59. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) ("The foundation of jurisdiction is
physical power") (dictum). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note
27, §§ 8-11.
60. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877). The territorial power theory of jurisdic-
tion rests on two jurisdictional principles, which were set forth in Pennoyer:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent,
many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in
the government created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by
that instrument, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and
the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of
these principles is, that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty
over persons and property within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the
power to determine for itself the civil status and capacities of its inhabitants . . ..
The other principle of public law referred to follows from the one mentioned; that is,
that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property
without its territory. . . .The several States are of equal dignity and authority, and
the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. And so it is
laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no
operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no
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power to exercise personal jurisdiction from the defendant's pres-
ence within the sovereign's territory. 1
The presence. basis often is criticized on the ground that the
power theory is contrary to fundamental principles of fairness.2
Some commentators have vociferously urged that jurisdiction
should be asserted against a defendant only if the exercise is fair,"
and that the presence amenability basis should be replaced en-
tirely by a due process analysis.6 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has reconciled the power theory and due process
principles. In World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,s s the Court
found that the fourteenth amendment due process test performs
two related but distinct functions: (1) preserving the sovereignty of
each state's judicial system from encroachment by other states;6"
and (2) protecting defendants from the burden of litigating in a
tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject
either persons or property to its decisions.
Id. (emphasis in original).
61. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 199 & n.17 (1977).
62. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 20.
63. See id.; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tax. L. REv. 657 (1959);
Von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121 (1966).
64. See Traynor, supra note 63, at 658-59; Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 63, at
1164-79. But cf. Ehrenzweig, supra note 20, at 312-14 (concern for fairness to a defendant
should not be the sole inquiry, instead, the most appropriate forum should be selected and
state courts should develop interstate venue to seek a "forum conveniens"). Id. at 312-14.
See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CH. L. REV.
268, 299-307 (1969); Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal
Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. Rav. 608 (1954) (suggesting that functions and
requirements of personal jurisdiction and venue should be united).
65. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
66. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court stated that the due process concept of min-
imum contacts "[a]cts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out
beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as co-equal sovereigns in a federal sys-
tem." Id. at 292. Accordingly, the Constitution upholds each state's sovereign right to try
cases in its own courts. Id. at 293-94. But see Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Campagnie des
Bauxites de Guinea, 102 S. Ct. 2099 (1982). In that case the court attempted to clarify the
interstate federalism concept enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen:
It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as
applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the character of state
sovereignty vis-a-vis other states. .. . The restriction on state sovereign power de-
scribed in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a
function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That
clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the clause itself
makes no mention of federalism concerns. .. . Individual actions cannot change the
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from
which he may otherwise be protected.
Id. at 2104 n.10. (citations omitted).
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distant or inconvenient forum.6 7
The first function, preservation of state sovereignty, is a con-
sideration shared by the power theory. In contrast to state courts,
however, federal courts do not need to be protected from encroach-
ment by other federal courts. District courts are not sovereign enti-
ties; they are part of one national court system."8 Under the na-
tional system, no district court has a superior right to entertain a
particular federal question. Therefore, an individual district court
does not encroach on another district's sovereignty by asserting
presence-based jurisdiction. Furthermore, because federal courts
may entertain only claims with an allowable subject matter, 9 as-
sertion of presence-based jurisdiction is restrained.7 0 Where sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question, that ques-
tion limits the scope of the litigation.7 1 Thus, even though a
defendant is present, the court may not assert presence-based ju-
risdiction unless the claim falls within the range of federal ques-
tion subject matter.
The second function, protection from litigation in an inconve-
nient forum, is typically described as the fairness part of the due
process examination. Although not included in the power theory,
67. Id. at 291-92.
68. For a detailed discussion of the division of the federal courts, see 1 J. GOEBEL,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 471-73 (1971). Goebel notes that
"[flor the purposes of judicial administration. . . a species of artificial federal entities was
to come into existence." Id. at 471. Article III of the United States Constitution and the
1789 Judiciary Act created inferior federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The original national judicial system had two sets of inferior courts.
Each state had a district court, and there were three circuit courts. Final appellate review
was vested in the supreme Court. For a detailed history of the federal court system, see F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928); P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 1-63; Warren, supra note 6, at 72-73.
69. See supra notes 1, 4, 6, 8 and accompanying text.
70. Von Mehren & Trautman have classified jurisdiction as "[1] unlimited general
jurisdiction, the ensuing judgment speaking without restriction to any of the judgment
debtor's assets; and [2] the judgment affecting only a specified fund or assets." Von Mehren
& Trautman, supra note 63, at 1136. Those terms also have been applied to the ability to
acquire jurisdiction. Thus, "the appropriate test for 'limited jurisdiction' focuses on the
nexus between the cause of action at issue and [a] defendant's activities within the forum."
Cornelison v. Chaney, 16 Cal. 3d 143, 153, 545 P.2d 264, 270, 127 Cal. Rptr. 352, 358 (1976)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
71. Federal courts entertaining federal question cases usually are limited to deciding
claims that arise out of the United States Constitution or federal statutes. However, under
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, federal courts may acquire jurisdiction over an entire
case and decide claims that have a substantial relationship to the federal question, thereby
allowing the joinder of state claims. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
A similar doctrine, ancillary jurisdiction, exists for diversity cases. See Owen Equip. & Erec-
tion Co. v. Kroger, 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
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the fairness consideration is harmonious with that theory in fed-
eral question cases. Unlike the circumstances in state courts, two
safeguards, independent of.the due process clause, ensure that de-
fendants will not be forced to litigate in an inconvenient federal
forum.
First, protection against inconvenience caused by factors such
as distance, witness availability and costs of litigation can be
achieved by using federal venue and transfer of venue provisions.7 3
Although personal jurisdiction concerns the power to adjudicate
and venue is concerned with providing a convenient forum, 4 both
ultimately attempt to prevent inconvenience." Thus, the ability to
72. In federal question cases, the defendant has a sufficient nexus with the federal
court by his involvement in a case arising under federal law. See infra note 77 and accompa-
nying text.
73. Venue for federal questions is governed by section 1391 which provides, in part:
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship
may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which
the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be re-
garded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b), (c) (1979). Many federal statutes, however, provide for special venue.
See infra notes 187-227 and accompanying text.
Transfer of venue for federal courts is governed by section 1404(a): "For the conve-
nience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a) (1976). Many courts view the venue and transfer of venue provisions as a last mea-
sure to protect a defendant from having to defend a case at an inconvenient location. See
First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 740 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
Some federal courts have combined their venue and amenability analysis to determine is-
sues of inconvenience. In large part, that approach rests on the assumption that the mini-
mum contacts due process test incorporates inconvenience criteria. See Kilpatrick v. Texas
& P. Ry., 166 F.2d 788, 790-91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814 (1948). In Kilpatrick, a'
case which arose under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the court held that the criteria
used in forum non conveniens were inseparable from the criteria used to determine amena-
bility to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 791. For a discussion of forum non conveniens, see
infra note 75.
74. See Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966):
Jurisdiction and venue, while comprising many of the same considerations, are not
the same thing .... Both are designed to test the fairness to the defendant and the
degree of inconvenience caused him by requiring him to litigate in a particular court
. But jurisdiction is relatively more concerned with fairness and venue more with
inconvenience.
Id. at 696 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 809
(1948); Ford v. Valmac Indus., 494 F.2d 330, 331 (10th Cir. 1974); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER &
E. COOPER, supra note 14, § 3801.
75. Compare World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (due
process analysis focusing on concern for protecting defendant from the burden of distant
litigation) with Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (forum non conveniens). In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the factors the Court considered included: the plaintiff's interests
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transfer a case to a more convenient federal court can alleviate the
need to assess convenience factors under a personal jurisdiction
due process analysis. 8
Second, federal question subject matter jurisdiction ensures
that sufficient nexus exists among the defendant, the federal forum
and the litigation.7 The subject matter in federal question cases is
created by the United States Constitution or federal statutes.
Thus, the question litigated has a direct connection with the fed-
eral forum. Because federal questions are an expression of the gov-
ernment's concern for federally created rights, the defendant es-
tablishes a connection with the federal government, and thus with
the federal forum, by seeking to take advantage of those rights.
Because there is a sufficient nexus among the defendant, the
federal forum and the litigation, the federal court system as the
interpreter and enforcer of federal law should have jurisdiction
over a defendant in cases concerned with federally created rights.
The application of state due process principles in federal courts is
objectionable both because it is an irrelevant exercise and because
it negates the federal court's otherwise valid right to assert
jurisdiction.
D. Inherent Limitations in Asserting Jurisdiction Under Rule 4
The difficulty with using Rule 4 to acquire jurisdiction does
not emanate entirely from the application of due process princi-
ples. Problems also occur because of the limited power delegated to
federal district courts.
Historically, the reach of district courts was limited to protect
in obtaining convenient and effective relief, obtaining the most efficient resolution of the
controversies, and furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 444 U.S. at 292. In
Gulf Oil, the Court considered "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of
willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises. . . ; and all other practical problems that
make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 330 U.S. at 508. See also Koupetoris
v. Konkar Intrepid Corp., 535 F.2d 1392 (2d Cir. 1976) (upholding jurisdiction under Rule
4(d)(3) but dismissing case under forum non conveniens doctrine); 1 J. MooRE, FEAL
PRA T cE, supra note 18, 0.142[5-1-3], at 0-1411.
76. See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Karchmar, 180 F. Supp. 727, 731-32
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (noting that criteria for determining amenability to personal jurisdiction
were equally applicable where determining forum non conveniens). Some commentators
have suggested combining venue and jurisdiction provisions. See Barrett, supra note 64, at
629-35; Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts Hearing Federal Cases: An Examination
of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by Venue RestrictionS, 37 GEo. WAsH. L. Rv.
82, 100 (1968).
77. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
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defendants from the inconvenience of travel78 and to protect states
from the encroaching powers of federal courts.79 Those concerns,
however, can be viewed as relics from the past. Venue and transfer
of venue rules serve to protect a defendant from inconvenience,
and it is well established that Congress has the power to determine
how jurisdiction can be asserted within the geographic territory of
the United States.80 In Rule 4, Congress gave district courts power
to exercise jurisdiction within limited geographic areas.81 Under
sections 4(d)(1)-(6), district courts can assert jurisdiction only
within the state in which the district court is located. Under sec-
tion 4(f), they can extend their jurisdictional powers into the 100-
mile bulge area for necessary and third-party defendants. The
problems with Rule 4, then, stem not from physical presence as a
basis of amenability but from the limited geographic area in which
that basis can be used.
III. STATE LONG-ARM STATUTES
State long-arm statutes provide an alternative basis under
Rule 4 for the assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal court.82
Most federal courts rely on those statutes to obtain jurisdiction
over parties outside the district court's geographic area. 3 However,
whether jurisdiction can be asserted in a particular federal court
depends on the applicable state statute. Because state long-arm
statutes vary in content and are interpreted differently, they often
are major hurdles to acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal
78. "[R]ecognizing the sentiment relative to the dragging of persons from their homes
long distances to the District Courts, the Senate, in Section 3, increased the number of
places at which such Courts should be held." Warren, supra note 6, at 72 (footnote
omitted).
79. Id. at 53, 62, 65-71.
80. See Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); United
States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300,
328 (1838); Picquet v. Swan, 19 Fed. Cas. 609, 611 (No. 11,134) (C.C.D. Mass. 1828). Al-
though the above cases frequently are cited for the proposition that Congress has the power
to provide nationwide service of process, all rely on sovereignty as the basis for that author-
ity. See also A.L.I. STUDY OF THE DMSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CoURTs § 2374(a) commentary-memorandum b (1969) [hereinfter cited as A.L.I. STUDY].
81. For the text of Rule 4, see supra note 17.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2), (7), (e), (f), (i).
83. Rules 4(e), (f) and (i) authorize the use of a state statute where service is made on
a party who ii not an inhabitant of or found within the state where the district court is
located. Id. 4(e), (f), (i). If personal service is made within the state where the district court
is located, Rule 4(d)(2) authorizes the use of a state statute for serving process on an infant
or incompetent. Id. 4(d)(2). Rule 4(d)(7) authorizes the use of a state statute where serving
process on either an individual, see id. 4(d)(1), or a corporation, see id. 4(d)(3). Id. 4(d)(7).
No. 21
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courts.8 4
This section examines the impact of state long-arm statutes on
personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. The differing con-
tent and interpretation of long-arm statutes are discussed in the
context of how those differences create a lack of uniformity in the
federal court system and often preclude federal courts from hear-
ing federal question cases.8 5 The varying constitutional limitations
federal courts have placed on state long-arm statutes then are
explored.
A. State Long-Arm Statutes: Difference in Type and
Interpretation
Long-arm statutes were enacted to enable individual states to
acquire jurisdiction over parties who were not physically present
in, a resident of, or domiciled within the state."' There are two
general categories of long-arm statutes. "Single act" statutes list
the types of acts that give a court jurisdiction over a nonresident. 7
84. Justices Black and Douglas, objecting to adoption of the amendment to Rule 4(e),
which provided for the use of state long-arm statutes to obtain personal jurisdiction in fed-
eral court, observed: "We also see no reason why the extent of a Federal District Court's
personal jurisdiction should depend on the existence or nonexistence of a state 'long-arm'
statute." Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts,
374 U.S. 863, 869 (1963).
85. See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. Rv.
157, 158-59, 171-72, 196 (1953). Professor Mishkin suggests a number of reasons why federal
question cases should be heard in federal court: to protect federal legislative programs, to
set federal policy, to provide a uniform interpretation of federal law, and to promote the
existence of an alternative forum that stimulates state courts to be more attentive to claims
of federal rights. Id. at 195-96. See also Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of
the Judicial Code, 13 LAw & CoNrrMp. PRoBs. 216, 218, 225-26 (1948); A.L.I. STUDY, supra
note 80, at 4, 162-68. The A.L.I. Study concluded that federal question jurisdiction should
be expanded because it is "necessary to preserve uniformity in federal law and to protect
litigants relying on federal law from the danger that state courts will not properly apply that
law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy." Id. at 4. See, e.g., Bartels v.
International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Conn. 1977) (action under the
1974 Commodity Act, jurisdiction denied because no applicable federal statute and state
long-arm requirements not met); Bernard v. Richter's Jewelry Co., 53 F.R.D. 606, 608
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (truth-in-lending action, jurisdiction denied because no applicable federal
jurisdiction statute and state long-arm statute requirement not met).
86. See Currie, supra note 64, at 300; D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND FEDERAL 14-16 (4th ed. 1979).
87. Jurisdiction under a single act statute is predicated on a nonresident engaging in
one of the acts specified by the statute. Those acts usually involve aspects of contract, tort,
or real property law. The Illinois statute is a typical "single act" state statute:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such
person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the
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"Due process" statutes provide simply that any action by a nonres-
ident that satisfies fourteenth amendment constitutional due pro-
cess requirements gives a court personal jurisdiction.88 Where state
courts apply "single act" statutes, they use a two-part test to de-
termine whether personal jurisdiction may be asserted.8 9 The
courts first examine compliance with the specific language of the
courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of such
acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting;
(e) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage and legal separation, the
maintenance in this state of a matrimonial domicile.
(2) Service of process on any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving the sum-
mons on the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with the same
force and effect as though summons had been personally served within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted against
a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based on this Section.
(4) Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any process in any
other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
Most single act statutes have been patterned after the Illinois statute, including the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, 13 U.L.A. 459-507 (master ed. 1980).
88. The California long-arm statute is one example of a due process statute: "A court
of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States." CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973). The Rhode
Island statute is another example of a due process statute:
Every foreign corporation, every individual not a resident of this state or his executor
or administrator, and every partnership or association, composed of any person or
persons, not such residents, that shall have the necessary minimum contacts with the
State of Rhode Island, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Is-
land, and the courts of this state shall hold such foreign corporations and such non-
resident individuals or their executors or administrators, and such partnerships or
associations amenable to suit in Rhode Island in every case not contrary to the provi-
sions of the Constitution or laws of the United States.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1970).
89. In Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977), the
Ninth Circuit stated: "[Niot only must the requirements of due process be met before a
court can properly assert in personam jurisdiction, but the exercise of jurisdiction must also
be affirmatively authorized by the legislature." Id. at 416. See also World-Wide Volkswagen
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290-91 (1980); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio
R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir. 1954); Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193,
194 (1st Cir. 1948). See generally 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 18, 1 4.41-1[1],
at 4-421-22; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 20, §§ 46 comment f, 73 com-
ment a; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 27, § 7 comment a. However,
where a state interprets its statute as conferring jurisdiction to the limits permitted by the
United States Constitution, the court can dispense with the statutory test. World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 290 (1980).
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statute. Next, they determine whether due process requirements
have been met. Due process statutes only require a determination
of whether the defendant's contacts with the forum state satisfy
due process.
A federal court, relying on a state statute to assert personal
jurisdiction, follows the same process.90 Thus, where a state "sin-
gle-act" statute is relied on for asserting personal jurisdiction, the
federal question must conform to the statutory language."1 Because
federal question cases concern unique federal rights, it is difficult
to classify them as one of the common law acts specified in the
state statutes. For example, federal courts have original subject
matter jurisdiction in trademark infringement cases.9 2 Personal ju-
risdiction and venue can be acquired under federal statute in cases
that involve foreign or multiple adverse parties residing in differ-
ent states or where the action is brought in the District of Colum-
bia." Where an action involves a single adverse party and is
90. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141-42 (7th Cir.
1975); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1965); FED. R. Civ. P. 81(e). See
also supra note 17.
91. See Elefteriou v. Tanker Archontissa, 443 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1971). Elefteriou in-
volved a merchant seaman's suit to recover damages for personal injury, maintenance and
wages under federal maritime law. Because the defendant was located outside the territorial
boundaries of the state in which the district court was located, Rule 4(e) allowed process to
be served under federal or state statute. Id. at 187-88. Because there was no applicable
federal statute, process was served pursuant to the Virginia long-arm statute, which is simi-
lar to the Illinois provision. See supra note 87. The district court held that the plaintiff's
claims did not fit within the enumerated acts of the Virginia statute and dismissed the case
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals ruled that the wage claim, basically a
contractual relationship, could give rise to a cause of action sounding in contract within the
meaning of the statute. 443 F.2d at 187-88. Cf. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express
Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 (9th Cir. 1977) (use of state long-arm statutes in diversity cases does
not present problems of classifying acts because subject matter does not differ from that
which could be brought in state courts).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976). That statute provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.
Id.
93. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1071(b)(1), (4) (Supp. IV 1980):
(b)(1) Whenever a person authorized by subsection (a) of this section to appeal to the
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals is dissatisfied with the decision
of the Commissioner or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, said person may, unless
appeal has been taken to said Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, have remedy by
a civil action . . ..
(4) Where there is an adverse party, such suit may be instituted against the party in
interest as shown by the records of the Patent and Trademark Office at the time of
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brought outside the District of Columbia, personal jurisdiction is
dependent on state long-arm statutes.' In Besuner v. Faberge,
Inc.,95 the defendant was located outside the territorial limits of
the federal district court, and personal jurisdiction was sought
under the Ohio long-arm statute." The court denied jurisdiction
even though the defendant had general business activities within
the state, holding that the trademark infringement had no rela-
tionship to Ohio and jurisdiction could not be asserted under any
of the specified acts in the Ohio statute.9
Even where a federal question satisfies one of the specific acts
in a state long-arm statute,98 reliance on those statutes creates ad-
the discussion complained of, but any party in interest may become a party to the
action. If there be adverse parties residing in a plurality of districts not embraced
within the same State, or an adverse party residing in a foreign country, the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and may
issue summons against the adverse parties directed to the marshall of any district in
which any adverse party resides. Summons against adverse parties residing in foreign
countries may be served by publication or otherwise as the court directs.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. Besuner v. Faberge, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1974). The court, in a trade-
mark infringement case, held that the question of personal jurisdiction and venue for a
single adverse party was not exclusively the province of section 1071(b)(1), 28 U.S.C. §
1071(b) (1). Personal jurisdiction also could be determined by applicable provisions of Rules
4(d)(1), 4(d)(3), 4(e) or 4(0. 379 F. Supp. at 280-81.
95. 379 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
96. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.38.2 (1953). The Ohio long-arm statute is a "single
act" statute.
97. 379 F. Supp. at 281. Cf. Marston v. Gant, 351 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Va. 1972) (juris-
diction denied in patent infringement action). Although the state long-arm statute at issue
in Marston allowed service for tortious injury within the state, the plaintiff could not show a
persistent course of conduct in the state or derivation of substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered in the state. Jurisdiction also could not be based on a
tortious injury by an act or omission within the state because the defendants had not taken
any steps tending to aid or abet the infringement in the state.
98. Single act statutes differ in each state. A state may emphasize different acts as a
basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(8) (West
1977) (personal jurisdiction may be asserted over any officer or director of a domestic corpo-
ration where action arises out of official conduct) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (Supp.
1980) (personal jurisdiction may be asserted over any officer, trustee or member of gov-
erning body of domestic corporation where director is a necessary or proper party to action)
with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981) (statute does not contain a
similar provision). At the time Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), was decided, Dela-
ware's long-arm statute did not contain a provision allowing the assertion of personal juris-
diction over nonresident defendant directors. The plaintiff had to rely on the Delaware se-
questration statute, which was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court. Id. at 191. Subsequently, Delaware enacted its current statute which authorizes juris-
diction over nonresident corporate director defendants.
Some states have enacted jurisdictional statutes that, by their terms, deal with specific
areas of law. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 1604 (West 1972) (service of process on persons who
transact insurance business within California); CAL. Pun. UTiL. CODE § 21414 (West 1965)
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ditional problems. One problem is that state long-arm statutes
may use different language to describe the acts that provide an
amenability basis for asserting jurisdiction.9 As a result of those
language differences, federal rights heard in one district court may
not be heard in another.
That inconsistency can be illustrated best by considering a hy-
pothetical case based on two single-act statutes that include the
commission of a tort as one of the enumerated acts. Plaintiff, a
resident of Illinois, sues defendant, a citizen and resident of Den-
mark, in the United States District Court for the District of Illinois
for patent infringement. Defendant manufactures a product in
Denmark that is almost identical to the one on -which plaintiff
holds a patent. Defendant's product is manufactured and sold in a
number of states but is not sold or manufactured in Illinois. Defen-
dant does not maintain an office, employ personnel, contract to sell
goods or real property and is not qualified to do business in Illi-
nois. Patent infringement can be a tort.100
The Illinois single-act statute provides for jurisdiction if a
nonresident commits "a tortious act within the state." 01 Because
the patent infringement did not occur within Illinois, jurisdiction
may not be available under that statute.
If the district court applied a long-arm statute like New
York's, which allows jurisdiction to be asserted over a nonresident
who commits "a tortious act without the state causing injury to
person or property within the state . . . if he expects or should
reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international com-
merce,"'1 2 the result probably would be different. Because the
plaintiff held the patent in Illinois and suffered the infringement
in that state, the defendant should have reasonably expected the
infringement to have consequences within Illinois. Additionally,
the defendant derives a substantial revenue from those sales,
which involve both interstate and international commerce. Thus,
the defendant probably would be amenable to jurisdiction.
(service of process on persons who use an airport within California).
99. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48-193(1)(a) (West Supp. 1981) ("Operates, conducts,
engages in, or carries on a business or business venture in this state or has an office or
agency in this state") with COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124(1)(a) (1974) ("The transaction of
any business within this state").
100. See, e.g., Marston v. Gant, 351 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (E.D. Va. 1972).
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1) (b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
102. N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 302(a)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981).
[1982: 285
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In addition to problems resulting from language differences,
court interpretations of state long-arm statutes also create a lack
of uniformity.103 Even though statutes are similar, courts interpret
them differently. For example, in applying similar long-arm stat-
utes in the patent infringement area, federal courts have differed
in their interpretation of whether a patent infringement can be
classified as one of the enumerated statutory acts.10'
Additionally, state courts differ in how broadly they construe
the statutory language of their long-arm statutes. Although some
single-act statutes apparently provide a narrow basis for asserting
jurisdiction, some state courts ignore the specific language and al-
low jurisdiction to be asserted to the full extent due process per-
mits.105 Other state statutes, which appear to provide a broad basis
for asserting jurisdiction, have been interpreted strictly.100
As an illustration, the Illinois long-arm statute07 allows juris-
diction to be asserted if a tort is committed within the state; Ili-
103. Compare Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill.
1967) (jurisdiction sustained under Illinois long-arm statute because defendant should have
been aware that its acts could cause injury in Illinois) with American Eutectic Welding Al-
loys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971) (jurisdiction denied under
New York long-arm statute because merely causing an injury within the state did not satisfy
statutory requirement).
104. Compare Honda Associates, Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 888-
89 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (personal jurisdiction sustained in action for trademark infringement
under tortious act provision of New York long-arm statute) and Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's
Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184, 186-89 (D. Del. 1974) (jurisdiction sustained in trade-
mark infringement action under Delaware doing business statute) with Besuner v. Faberge,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 278 (N.C. Ohio 1974) (concluding that trademark infringement did not fit
any of the specified acts in Ohio long-arm statute).
105. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). Federal courts have relied on state long-arm statutes but have ig-
nored the specific statutory language. See, e.g., Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F.
Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975). For a general discussion of state long-arm statutes, see 2 J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE, supra note 18, 4.41-1[3], at 4-475-502. It is not essential that
each state interpret its long-arm statute to permit the exercise of in personam jurisdiction
to the full extent permitted by the due process clause. See Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Min-
ing Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
106. Both the New York and Florida long-arm statutes are similar to the Illinois long-
arm statute. Illinois state courts have interpreted their statute as complying with due pro-
cess if the defendant commits a single statutory act. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143
N.E.2d 673 (1957). The New York and Florida long-arm statutes, however, are more strictly
construed; to meet due process standards, the defendant must have more contact with the
forum than engaging in a single act. See Masonite Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 412 F.
Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (interpretation based on due process concerns); Escambia
Treating Co. v. Otto Candies, Inc., 405 F. Supp. 1235, 1236 (N.D. Fla. 1975) (interpretation
based on legislative intent).
107. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981). For the text of the Illinois
long-arm statute, see supra note 87.
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nois courts have gone beyond the specific statutory language to
conclude that a tort occurs where the injury results. 0 8 In contrast,
New York courts have rejected a literal interpretation of that
state's long-arm statute,109 which appears to allow the exercise of
jurisdiction if the injury occurs within the state, 110 and requires the
actual tort, sale or manufacturing to have occurred within the
state."'
Because federal courts rely on a state court's interpretation
where a long-arm statute is used to assert federal jurisdiction,1 2
differences in interpretation have resulted in disparate jurisdic-
tional limitations in federal question cases.113 Instead of determin-
ing jurisdiction throughout the federal system in a uniform man-
ner, each federal district court acts autonomously.
B. Due Process Under State Long-Arm Statutes
Because both types of state long-arm statutes incorporate a
due process test, federal courts using those statutes also apply a
due process analysis.1 4 The application of due process principles
to state statutes creates problems of uniformity because federal
courts have developed three different ways to assess whether due
process has been satisfied. Some federal courts duplicate the state
court fourteenth amendment due process analysis." 5 Others pur-
108. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 M1. 2d 432, 435-46,
176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 IlM. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679-81
(1957). Federal courts relying on the Illinois long-arm statute have adopted the same inter-
pretation. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1142 (7th Cir.
1975).
109. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1981).
110. See id.
ill. See Black v. Oberle Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 398, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1967).
112. See authorities cited supra note 90.
113. See supra notes 90-111 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., Ltd., 432 F. Supp. 1302, 1305-09
(E.D. Mich. 1976) (patent infringement and unfair competition); Stanley v. Local 926, Int'l
Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267, 1270-71 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (civil rights class
action).
115. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)
(admiralty); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975) (patent
infringement); Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968) (Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act); Ag-Tronic, Inc. v. Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976)
(patent infringement); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (Sherman Act); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D.
216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (recovery of past due income taxes); First Flight Co. v. National Car-
loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (damage suit against common carrier);
Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961) (Fair Labor
Standards Act).
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port to apply a fifth amendment due process test, while in reality
applying fourteenth amendment standards. 18 Still others apply a
fifth amendment test, examining the sufficiency of the defendant's
contacts with the United States.117 Although federal courts all es-
pouse one of those three approaches, several courts actually rely on
federal venue or transfer of venue statutes to ensure fairness to a
defendant.118
Federal courts that duplicate state courts' fourteenth amend-
ment due process analysis by examining defendants' contacts with
the state have offered several reasons for adopting that approach.
In Stanley v. Local 926, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers,1 1 9 a civil rights case in which the Georgia long-arm statute
was applied, the court suggested that the federal court should use
the same analysis implemented by the state court.120 The Stanley
court reasoned that because Rule 4(e) required that the method of
serving process and the basis for jurisdiction be effected under
state statute, the fourteenth amendment minimum contacts test
must be followed in accordance with established state precedent. 21
116. See, e.g., Cr~omedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975)
(patent infringement); Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973)
(Death on the High Seas Act). See also Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 63, at 1123-25
n.6; Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 VAND.
L. REV. 967 (1961); Note, Jurisdiction of Federal District Courts Over Foreign Corpora-
tions, 69 HARV. L. REv. 508 (1956).
117. See, e.g., Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1957)
(copyright, trademark infringement and unfair competition). Rather than dismissing the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction or transferring the case to a more convenient forum,
the Bar's Leaks court dismissed the action for improper venue. Id. at 713-14.
118. In Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973), the court
asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant under the Michigan long-arm statute but
admitted that the only connection with the forum state was the plaintiff's residence. The
Holt court then transferred the case to the Southern District of Florida. Id. at 359.
119. 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
120. Id. at 1270. In Stanley Works Corp. v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325, 1337
(D. Mass. 1975), the district court summarized the relationship of Rule 4 to state long-arm
statutes by stating that where a state long-arm statute is used in a federal question case
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7), both the manner of service in 4(d)(7) and the circumstances of
service in 4(e) must be satisfied. Id. at 1337.
121. 354 F. Supp. at 1270. Rather than apply a fourteenth amendment due process
test in a federal forum, the court, in Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546 (4th Cir.
1965), found that the state's exercise of jurisdictional power was coterminous with the per-
missive limits of due process. Id. at 549. Accord Amburn v. Harold Forster Indus., Ltd., 423
F. Supp. 1302, 1304-05 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (patent infringement case, process based on Mich-
igan long-arm statute); Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778, 782-83
(E.D. Pa. 1961) (Federal Employer's Liability Act, service based on Rule 4(d)(3)). But see
Scott v. Middle East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (admiralty proceeding
under Death on the High Seas Act). The Scott court stated that both a federal and state
standard may be required to determine amenability to suit. Id. at 5. It reasoned that state
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A majority of federal courts recognize the anomaly created by
applying the fourteenth amendment in federal court, and instead
apply a fifth amendment analysis. 122 Even where federal courts ap-
ply the fifth amendment, however, they have not devised a uni-
form test. One approach has been to rely on a fifth amendment
rationale to examine a defendant's contacts with the forum state,
thus effectively applying a fourteenth amendment due process test.
That was the approach adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Honey-
well, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke. 23 The Honeywell court justified
the use of a "fifth-fourteenth amendment" test by finding no oper-
ative difference between the concept of due process as applied to
the states and as applied to the federal government.
12
'
law should be applied because of precedent, and that a federal standard should be applied
because the right created is purely federal. Id.
122. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir.
1975); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir.
1954); Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F. Supp. 778, 781-83 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
Some commentators have suggested that the due process clause of the fifth amendment is
applicable. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 18, at 31; Green, supra note 116, at 973. Professor
Abraham found that "[t] here is no clear reason why the 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice' embodied in the fifth amendment should not also encompass some mea-
sure of protection against inconvenient litigation, even though the protection is not identical
to that afforded by the fourteenth amendment." Abraham, Constitutional Limitations
Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 VmL. L. REv. 520, 536 (1963). See also
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTs, supra note 27, § 7 comment f. In discussing the
constitutional and legislative determinants of territorial jurisdiction, the reporters
commented:
At least within the territorial limits of the United States, the territorial jurisdiction of
the federal courts is restricted only because the constitutional restrictions on state
court jurisdiction have been incorporated by reference in the legislation governing the
federal courts. It has been asserted that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment may embody a constraint on the range of process issuing from a federal court. If
legislation were adopted that permitted process to issue from a federal court in a
location completely unconnected with an action, thereby compelling a defendant to
journey a grossly inconvenient distance to such a forum, the contention could be
made that the legislation is incompatible with the Fifth Amendments requirements
of fairness. Such a situation has not yet arisen.
Id. at 57.
123. 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
124. The court stated:
[A] federally created right is at issue, and due process is properly a matter for exami-
nation in light of the Fifth Amendment rather than the Fourteenth Amendment.
That is not to say, however, that the International Shoe line of cases is irrele-
vant to our inquiry here. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is essen-
tially a recognition of the principles of justice and fundamental fairness in a given set
of circumstances .... [W]e can perceive no operative difference between the concept
of due process as applied to the states and as applied to the federal government. This
and other courts have reached this result, explicitly or tacitly, and have applied the
"minimum contacts" standard to federal question cases in which in personam juris-
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A second and more cogent reason for applying a "fifth-four-
teenth amendment" test was expressed by the court in Ag-Tronic,
Inc. v. Frank Paviour, Ltd.125 There, the court found that the ap-
plication of a state statute necessitates incorporating that state's
due process analysis. 126 Thus, the court concluded that where ser-
vice is made pursuant to a state long-arm statute as permitted by
Rule 4, there must be compliance with both the language of the
statute and the due process requirements that govern it. 1 27
Because the fourteenth amendment serves only as a limitation
on state action, the "fifth-fourteenth amendment" analysis is
flawed. Whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with the state
forum is irrelevant in determining whether the defendant has an
adequate nexus with the federal forum. Because federal due pro-
cess is primarily concerned with factors other than convenience,2 B
the fourteenth amendment due process test is operatively different
than federal notions of due process. Furthermore, although Rules
4(d)(7) and 4(e) dictate that a federal court must comply with
state long-arm provisions for service and amenability to jurisdic-
tion, 2 9 those provisions do not mandate that a federal court adopt
state due process tests in federal question cases.13 0
diction was at issue, and we deem it appropriate to do so here.
Id. at 1143 (citations omitted). But see Goldberg v. Mutual Readers League, Inc., 195 F.
Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1961). In a case applying the Pennsylvania long-arm statute, the
Goldberg court observed that the formula of International Shoe had no effect on questions
of federal jurisdiction and was of "doubtful applicability," stating:
The Fifth Amendment contains a Due Process Clause, but its limitation on the juris-
diction of the Federal District Courts over foreign corporations has never been clearly
stated. The result is that we are left at best with an anomalous body of "Federal law"
from which to discern the principles applicable to this case.
Id. at 782.
125. 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976).
126. Id. at 398-99. Accord Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,
416-19 (9th Cir. 1977); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F.
Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
127. 70 F.R.D. at 398-99. The court's reasoning was similar to that expressed in Stan-
ley v. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 354 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. Ga. 1973). See
supra notes 119-121 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 17 for the text of Rule 4.
130. The court in Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147,
153-54 (5th Cir. 1954), correctly reasoned that federal courts are to interpret state long-arm
statutes in federal question cases in accordance with state law but that compliance with due
process requires compliance with a federal standard. See also First Flight Co. v. National
Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 737-38 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). First Flight is frequently
cited for the proposition that compliance with due process in federal question cases is a
federal matter. Service of process in First Flight, however, was effected under Rule 4(d)(3)
rather than the state long-arm statute because the defendant was present and served with
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The belief that adoption of a state's due process analysis is
required where its statute is applied is part of the uncertainty over
whether state or federal law should govern in federal court.'
Where a state statute is used by federal courts to assert jurisdic-
tion, the state court's interpretation of the statutory language may
be applied because compliance with the statute raises questions of
state law. However, adoption of a state's interpretation of its long-
arm statute does not require the federal court to embrace the
state's constitutional due process test. 3 2 The constitutional due
process issue should be a question of federal law.s
One federal district court fashioned an imaginative response to
state due process analysis by creating a fifth amendment ap-
proach,"" which subsequent cases have called the "aggregated con-
process within the state.
131. Applying a federal or state standard raises different questions in federal question
cases than in diversity cases. In Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.
1963), the court stated: "We express no opinion whether a 'federal standard' may govern
jurisdiction over foreign corporations in federal question litigation.... Suffice it to say
that the considerations favoring the overriding of state policy would be far more persuasive
than in an ordinary diversity suit." Id. at 228 n.9. However, the court in Scott v. Middle
East Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), extended the dicta in Arrowsmith and
concluded that federal courts ought to presume that, in a federal question case, federal law
governs unless some overriding reason requires otherwise. Id. at 5. See also 2 J. MooRsE,
FEDERAL PRACTCE, supra note 18, 1 4.25[7], at 279-92.
132. See, e.g., Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153-
54 (5th Cir. 1954); First Flight Co. v. National Car Loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-38
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
133. Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153 (5th Cir.
1954).
134. Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber, 289 F. Supp. 381 (S.D. Ohio
1967). Although responsible for fashioning the aggregated contacts test, the Moriarty court
did not apply it. Instead, the court applied the International Shoe minimum contacts test
and examined whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the state. In so doing, the
Moriarty court stated:
Unfortunately, this course has not been left open to us by the federal rules or stat-
utes. That is, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has provided statute or rule
whereby substituted service may be made upon an alien corporation having certain
minimal contacts with the United States. And when substituted service is made pur-
suant to a state long-arm statute, as it was in this case, then the rules provide that
service be made "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the stat-
ute.... ." Rule 4(e)(2), FED. R. Civ. P. (emphasis added).
We take the italicized portion to mean that when service is made pursuant to a
state long-arm statute, it is only proper when the corporation served meets the quali-
fications for service set out in that statute.
2. It should be noted that, in those cases set out on this page and other cases
researched by the Court, whenever the "federal" test of jurisdiction is applied, the
Court invariably winds up looking at the contacts of the foreign corporation with the
state, rather than with the United States. While we believe this to be a misconception
of the "federal" test as we have applied it, the lack of means to pursue the proper
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tacts test."135 That test adopts the framework of the minimum
contacts test established in International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton.138 Instead of examining whether a defendant's contacts with
the state are sufficient, however, the court examines the sufficiency
of a defendant's contacts with the United States. 37 The rationale
for that approach is that a defendant's contacts with the state are
irrelevant where a federally created cause of action is involved. Be-
cause the federal district court is part of a national court system,
personal jurisdiction is valid where a party's contacts with the
United States are sufficient.13 8
The aggregation test purportedly was adopted by three district
courts in Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, '3 9 Engineered Sports Prod-
ucts v. Brunswick Co.1 40 and Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd.14 1
An examination of those cases reveals, however, that only Holt ac-
tually applied the aggregation test.142 The Holt court examined the
course leaves room for no other result.
Id. at 390 & n.2 (emphasis in original). Other courts agree that federal court jurisdiction
should not be dependent on state due process limitations but also have felt stymied by lack
of legislative authority to apply an aggregated contacts approach. See, e.g., Ag-Tronics, Inc.
v. Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393, 400-01 (D. Neb. 1976). The Ag-Tronic court refused
to follow a case from its district, Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287 (D.
Conn. 1975), which the Ag-Tronic court believed had applied an aggregated contacts test.
See also First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 737-38 (E.D. Tenn.
1962).
135. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir.
1975).
136. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
137. In Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381
(S.D. Ohio 1967), the court examined an alien defendant's contacts with Ohio because juris-
diction was asserted under that state's long-arm statute. The Moriarty court suggested,
however, that an examination of the defendant's contacts with the United States would be a
more logical approach for a fifth amendment due process test in federal question cases.
138. Id. The Moriarty court found that-
[T]he judicial jurisdiction over the person of the defendant does not relate to the
geographical power of the particular court which is hearing the controversy, but to
the power of the unit of government of which that court is a part. .. [ .T]he consti-
tutional test of personal jurisdiction involves a determination as to whether the de-
fendant has certain minimal contacts with the forum state . ..
[Tihe appropriate inquiry to be made in a federal court where suit is based upon
a federally created right is whether the defendant has certain minimal contacts with
the United States, so as to satisfy due process requirements under the Fifth
Amendment.
Id. at 390.
139. 355 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Mich. 1973) (admiralty action).
140. 362 F. Supp. 722 (D. Utah 1973) (patent infringement).
141. 397 F. Supp. 287 (D. Conn. 1975) (patent infringement).
142. Holt was instituted by a Michigan citizen against a Norwegian corporation under
the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1964). Personal jurisdiction was
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defendant's activities throughout the United States, after noting
that the defendant's activities in Michigan alone were insufficient
to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 4"
The district court in Engineered Sport, although professing to
examine the aggregate of the defendant's contacts, did not do so.
Instead, the court examined the extent to which the defendant
could foresee that engaging in certain worldwide activity would
cause injury in the forum.1 " Rather than an aggregation test, the
court applied a "foreseeabiity" analysis 45 similar to that used for
fourteenth amendment due process inquiries.14 6 Similarly, the Cry-
sought under the Michigan long-arm statute. The defendant had its main office in Oslo,
Norway and operated a fleet of tour ships that embarked from Miami, Florida, touring prin-
cipally in the Caribbean Sea. The corporation maintained offices in New York, Chicago,
Cleveland, Dallas and Los Angeles and solicited business through travel agencies that issued
tickets in Chicago, Miami and New York. The defendant also owned a laundry business, a
corporation that had real estate holdings in Florida, a car leasing company, a freight com-
pany and a cattle farm. None of those contacts, however, involved Michigan. The court
observed:
Taken as a whole, defendant's contacts with the United States, both qualitatively and
quantitatively, are constitutionally sufficient to enable this court to render a binding
judgment against it. Defendant has elected to enter the territorial domain of the
United States for its economic gain. It has established itself in an identifiable geo-
graphic location to effectuate and maximize its business dealings. It has promoted its
product on a national scale through advertising and other market networks. Clearly,
defendant's contacts with the United States exceed any constitutional minimum for a
limited in personam jurisdiction.
Id. at 358.
143. The court stated:
[The defendant] had several sporadic contacts with the State of Michigan. It con-
tacted local travel agencies in an effort to drum up business. It also advertised occa-
sionally in Detroit newspapers. However, all these contacts, assuming this were a di-
versity case, would be insufficient to meet the "minimum contacts" of International
Shoe or the Michigan jurisdictional statutes.
Id. at n.5 (citations omitted).
144. 362 F. Supp. at 725-28.
145. Engineered Sports involved a patent infringement claim againt an alien defen-
dant. Personal jurisdiction was based on the Utah long-arm statute. The court examined the
nature of the defendant's business and concluded that only one-fiftieth involved Utah con-
sumers. The court held that even though the defendant did not have extensive direct con-
tacts with the forum state, the sale of its product to domestic distributors could lead to
resale in the United States and ultimately the forum. Thus, the defendant should have fore-
seen that injury could result in Utah and was, therefore, amendable to jurisdiction. Id.
146. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961). The Honeywell court stated:
Direct contact with the forum state is not essential to the exercise of personal juris-
diction. Metz may not have physically entered the state of Illinois, but it placed its
flash devices in the stream of commerce under such circumstances that it should rea-
sonably have anticipated that injury through infringement would occur there.
509 F.2d at 1144.
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omedics court, although discussing the federal test, did not aggre-
gate the alien defendant's contacts. The court relied instead on an-
other district court's finding that the defendant was subject to
personal jurisdiction in similar litigation. 147 The court reasoned
that the particular state asserting personal jurisdiction makes little
difference to an alien defendant because any United States forum
is inconvenient. 148
Although agreeing in principle that the aggregated contacts
test may be justified, the Ninth Circuit, in Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co.,149 criticized the test and its applica-
tion. 15 Declining to apply the aggregation test,151 the Wells Fargo
court criticized it as an adoption of nationwide service of process
by judicial flat. According to the Ninth Circuit, such a novel ap-
proach should be adopted by the legislature rather than the
courts.
152
A close look at federal courts' application of state long-arm
statutes suggests that, in addition to applying due process princi-
ples, federal venue and transfer of venue statutes are used to re-
strict the exercise of personal jurisdiction.153 Federal courts have
147. 397 F. Supp. at 292. The court commented:
Although Spembly is involved now in multiple litigation in the United States, some of
it apparently of its own initiation, the proper remedy for that problem is a motion to
stay one or more proceedings; Cryomedics has alleged substantial contacts with the
United States, and at oral argument Spembly conceded that it could not successfully




149. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
150. Id. at 416-19.
151. The court first distinguished Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287
(D. Conn. 1975), and Engineered Sports Products v. Brunswick Co., 362 F. Supp. 722 (D.
Utah 1973), by observing that in both those cases, the aggregate of the defendants' contacts
contravened specific language of the state statutes. 556 F.2d at 416-18. The court observed
that in Engineered Sports, the Utah long-arm statute provided for jurisdiction over a "de-
fendant who caused 'any injury within the state."' Id. at 417. The Wells Fargo court ex-
plained that, unlike the Utah statute, the Nevada statute did not contain a similar provision
and that "only causes of action 'arising from' enumerated 'acts' which took place 'within'
Nevada may be reached." Id.
152. Id. at 418. Other courts have taken a similar position. See, e.g., Ag-Tronic, Inc. v.
Frank Paviour, Ltd., 70 F.R.D. 393 (D. Neb. 1976):
[U]nless Congress has provided for nationwide service of process, when the defendant
is a foreign corporation it must have an agent within the territorial limits of the State
in which the court sits, unless substituted service or extrastate service can be made
pursuant to Rule 4(d)(7) when a state statute so authorizes.
Id. at 400.
153. See Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (N.D. Cal.
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recognized that those statutes serve to restrict personal jurisdiction
even though they are based on fairness considerations that are dis-
tinct from due process.15 4 Nevertheless, they have hastened to em-
brace venue principles as a substitute for a due process assessment.
Federal court restrictions on state long-arm statutes are a di-
rect consequence of federal court adherence to state implementa-
tion of these statutes. Because state courts include an assessment
of due process, federal courts, lacking legislative guidance to the
contrary, also have adopted some type of due process analysis. The
result has been a lack of uniformity in how federal courts deter-
mine whether to assert personal jurisdiction under state long-arm
statutes.
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES
Where a defendant is not present within the geographic
boundaries of the federal court, Rule 4 provides that federal stat-
utes may be used as an .alternative basis for serving process and
determining amenability to personal jurisdiction. 55 Historically,
Congress has taken two statutory approaches to personal jurisdic-
tion in federal court: (1) general statutes that do not specify a par-
ticular subject area as a basis for asserting jurisdiction;5'e and (2)
specific federal statutes, which apply to designated federal subject
areas. 15
7
1957) (suggesting that federal venue is a broader, more inclusive inquiry than personal
jurisdiction).
154. See, e.g., Bar's Leaks Western, Inc. v. Pollock, 148 F. Supp. 710, 714 (N.D. Cal.
1957); Lehn & Fink Products Corp. v. Milner Products Co., 117 F. Supp. 320, 322 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Ronson Art Metal Works, Inc. v. Brown & Bigelow, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 716, 723-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
155. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), (f). For the text of Rule 4, see supra note 17.
156. Seee.g., Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
157. Specific federal jurisdiction statutes provide for personal jurisdiction that extends
beyond the territorial boundaries of a federal district court. The following federal jurisdic-
tion statutes allow for nationwide service of process: Credit Mobilier Act, 17 Stat. 485, ch.
226 (1873) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 88 (1976)) ("proper district court" shall have
jurisdiction in mandamus actions against Union Pacific Railroad); Commodity Exchange
Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1976) (action brought by Commodity Fixtures Trading Com-
mission); Plant Quarantine Act, id. § 150dd(b) (action brought by Secretary of Agriculture);
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (confirmation of arbitrator's award); Bank-
ruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. III 1979) (bankruptcy court jurisdiction); Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1455(b) (1976) (action brought by Fed-
eral Home Mortgage Corporation); National Housing Act, id. § 1725(c)(4) (creation of Fed-
eral Savings & Lean Insurance Corp.); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 10 (1976) (joining addi-
tional parties); Clayton Act, id. § 22 (actions by United States against corporation); id. § 25
(actions to restrain violations of act); Federal Trade Commission Act, id. § 49 (1976) (ac-
tions by Federal Trade Commission to enforce subpoenas); Securities Act of 1933, id. §
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Although federal jurisdictional statutes specifically grant per-
sonal jurisdiction in federal question cases, their approach to ac-
quiring jurisdiction is not uniform. Instead, they reflect haphazard
approaches, which have been prompted by specific political con-
cerns or pressures. Exacerbating the piecemeal congressional ap-
proach are the nonuniform constitutional limitations imposed by
federal courts.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 and the special federal juris-
dictional statutes contain similar language to that of the 1789 Ju-
diciary Act.15 By examining the original Act and its amendments,
insight into Congressional concerns about federal personal jurisdic-
tion can be gained. This section examines Congress' legislative ap-
proach by discussing the 1789 Judiciary Act, several special federal
jurisdictional statutes and the problems encountered with each. In
addition, the federal judiciary's imposition of constitutional limits
on the exercise of jurisdiction under those federal statutes is
explored.
A. Personal Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Act
In 1789, the first United States Congress enacted a statute
governing general jurisdiction and venue for federal courts. Al-
though the Judiciary Act provided for service of process and
77v(a) (actions to prosecute violations of the Act); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, id. §
77vvv(b) (actions to enforce or prosecute violations of the Act); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, id. §§ 78u(b),(c) (subpoena of witnesses); id. § 78aa (actions to enforce or prosecute
violations of the Act); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, id. § 79y (actions to
enforce or prosecute violations of the Act); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a-43 (1976); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, id. § 80b-14 (actions to enforce or prosecute
violations of the Act); Antitrust Civil Process Act, id. § 1312(d)(1)(2) (antitrust investigative
demand by United States Attorney General); Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, id.
§ 1719 (interstate land sales); Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. § 375 (1976) (determination of heirship of deceased members of five civilized tribes);
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, §
3, 90 Stat. 2721) (actions against federal officers); id. § 1655 (originally enacted as Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944) (lien enforcement); id. § 1695 (originally enacted as Act
of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 945) (shareholder derivative action); Interstate Commerce
Enforcement Act, id. § 2321 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (actions by United States under Inter-
state Commerce laws); id. § 2413 (originally enacted as Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 118,
63 Stat. 105) (execution in favor of United States); 38 U.S.C. § 784(a) (1976) (originally
enacted as Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, 72 Stat. 1165) (suits on United States
government insurance); Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1976) (suit on payment bond for
unpaid amount for labor furnished on public works by private contractors); Atomic Energy
Damages Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1976) (public liability actions by Nuclear Regulatory
Commission).
158. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
No. 2]
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venue, 159 it did not specifically describe an amenability basis for
personal jurisdiction. Service of process was proper in two places:
(1) in a district where the defendant resided and (2) in any district
where the defendant could be found at the time of service. Venue
was proper in any district where process was effectively served.160
Because process could follow a defendant and no provisions set
forth a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction, the process and
venue language suggest that the amenability basis under the Act
was physical presence. Using presence as the amenability basis,
federal district courts could assert jurisdiction over any person
found within their boundaries.1 61 Therefore, the Act, in practice,
159. The Act provides:
But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action
before a circuit or district court. . . .And no civil suit shall be brought before either
of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original process in
any other district other than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall
be found at the time of serving the writ.
Id. § 11, 1 Stat. 79 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878). In discussing the 1789
Judiciary Act, the Court commented:
It is true that Congress has enacted that no person shall be sued in a circuit court of
the United States who does not reside within the district for which the court is estab-
lished, or who is not found there. But a citizen residing in Oregon may be sued in
Maine, if found there, so that process can be served on him.
Id. at 604.
Under the Act, courts could not reach beyond the artificial lines defining their territory.
See Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 5,657). In Graham, the peti-
tioner was served with process in Pennsylvania pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by
the Rhode Island circuit court. The Pennsylvania court held that the Judiciary Act did not
allow the United States circuit and district courts to send their process into another district
except where specifically authorized. In discussing those limitations, the court stated:
The manifest policy of the judicial system of the United States, was to render the
administration of Justice as little oppressive to suitors and others as possible; and it
corresponds entirely with that construction, which confines the process of the courts
within the limits of the district in which the court sits, and from which it issued.
Id. at 913. See also Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300 (1838). The Toland Court
commented on the purpose of the process language in the 1789 Judiciary Act:
Nothing can be more unjust, than that a person should have his rights passed upon,
and finally decided by a tribunal, without some process being served upon him, by
which he will have notice, which will enable him to appear and defend himself. ...
[W]e find, that the process of capias is in terms limited to the district within
which it is issued.
Id. at 328.
Frequently, the district court boundaries encompassed a smaller geographic area than
the state where the district courts were located. See, e.g., Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609,
612 (C.C. Mass. 1828); Ex parte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911, 912 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1818) (No.
5,657). The Picquet court remarked that the United States was divided into judicial dis-
tricts and that jurisdiction over persons and property was available only within the limits of
the district: "This results from the general principle that a court created within and for a
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allowed nationwide personal jurisdiction.
Congress restricted the potentially sweeping jurisdiction of the
1789 venue and process language by amending the Judiciary Act in
1878.162 The amendment deleted the language allowing service of
process on the defendant anywhere he was found and limited ser-
vice of process to the district where a defendant resided.16 s The
legislative history of the amendment suggests that it was
prompted, in part, by convenience concerns.'" By focusing on pro-
tecting citizens from litigation in distant forums, however, Con-
gress did not consider the amendment's effect on personal jurisdic-
tion in federal courts. In addition, the drafters failed to address
the impact that curtailed personal jurisdiction would have on fed-
eral adjudication of federal question cases.16 5
Predictably, after the 1878 amendment, federal courts exper-
particular territory is bounded in the exercise of its power by the limits of such territory."
19 F. Cas. at 611. See also J. GOEBEL, supra note 68, at 471. In discussing the structure of
the lower federal courts, Goebel observed that the idea of dividing the country into a num-
ber of districts instead of having a federal court in each state was patterned after state
legislation designed for convenient administration of justice. But see Act of May 4, 1858, ch.
27, §§ 1, 2, 11 Stat. 272 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1392 (1976)) (allowing a district court
to serve process throughout the state where located).
162. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552.
163. Id. The amendment eliminated the language "or in which he is found at the time
of serving the writ," see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 79, and created new venue
language for diversity cases: "[Wihere the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the
action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the
residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat.
552, 552. For debate on the amendments, see 18 CONG. REc. 613, 2542, 2545 (1887).
164. "The object of the bill [H.R. 2441, 49th Cong., 2d Sess. (1887), amending the Act
of Mar. 3, 1875], is to diminish the jurisdiction of the circuit courts and the Supreme Court
of the United States, to promote the convenience of the people, and to lessen the burden
and expense of litigation." 18 CONG. Rac. 613, 613 (1887) (remarks of Rep. Culberson). Rep-
resentative Culberson's version of the bill did not strike the "wherever found" language.
That change was made in amendments by the Senate Judiciary Committee. See id. at 2542.
In actuality, the changed service of process language was only a small part of the 1878
amendments. Other changes included: requiring a jury trial for issues of fact in circuit
courts, adding sections on receivership and banking associations, requiring a clear showing
of a federal question defense before a case could be removed from a state to a federal court,
creation of venue language specifically applying to cases based on diversity of citizenship (in
"the district of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant"), increasing the amount in
controversy requirement, limiting access to federal courts by assignees, and declaring that
corporations were citizens only where they were doing business. Id. at 2542-45.
165. That absence of discussion perhaps can be attributed to Congress' unfamiliarity
with jurisdiction problems in federal question cases. Although the Constitution states that
"judicial Power shall extend to all Cases. . .arising under this Constitution, [and] the Laws
of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, Congress did not generally confer original
federal question jurisdiction on federal courts until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §
1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. 1980)); supra notes 6-9 and
accompanying text.
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ienced difficulty acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal question
cases.' The problem was particularly acute where a case arising
under federal law involved multiple defendants located in different
districts. Rather than fashioning a comprehensive legislative re-
sponse to that problem, Congress reacted to specific crises, either
by amending the Judiciary Act on a piecemeal, short-term basis or
by enacting special jurisdictional statutes. 6 7
The 1922 revisions of the general venue and service of process
sections of the Judiciary Code 6 illustrate Congress' ad hoc re-
sponse to the problems of jurisdiction in federal question cases. At
the end of World War I, Congress directed the Department of Jus-
tice to sue contractors that had defrauded the government on war-
time contracts.' The Attorney General reported that, although
many war fraud cases involved multiple defendants who lived in
different districts, jurisdictional statutes permitted federal suit
only in the district where all defendants resided. 170 In response to
that problem, Congress adopted the Attorney General's propo-
sal,'7 ' which permitted the United States to sue in a district where
166. It was difficult for federal courts to acquire jurisdiction because jurisdiction could
only be asserted where a defendant resided. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167. Cf. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal
Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1972). Hufstedler made the following observation about
federal subject matter jurisdiction:
A less charitable and equally accurate view is that Congressional reaction to issues of
federal jurisdiction has always been fitful and that the fits are usually induced by
strong pressures imposed by particular events or by powerful constituencies that seek
to influence results in particular causes that concern them. Congress has rarely 'un-
dertaken a comprehensive re-examination of federal jurisdiction. Indeed, it has not
made the attempt for almost 100 years.
Id. at 842-43 (footnote omitted).
168. Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849.
169. Congress directed the Attorney General to investigate, indict and prosecute crim-
inal conduct and to institute civil suits for the recovery of overpayments on war contracts
for building ships, airplanes, and cantonments, and for purchasing munitions and war sup-
plies. A staff of 25 lawyers conducted 800 investigations, and the government recovered
$8,500,000. That obscure episode in American history is discussed in 6 M. SULLIVAN, OUR
TIMES: THE UNITED STATES 1900-1925 at 203-07 (1937).
170. See S. REP. No. 868, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1922): "[I]t seems rather anomalous
that the right of the Government to enforce its just claims against its own citizens should be
defeated by narrow restrictions upon the jurisdiction of the Federal courts."
171. Piecemeal legislation was not limited to the war frauds nationwide service of pro-
cess statute. Another example of congressional action induced by political pressures is the
federal jurisdictional statute prompted by the Credit Mobilier scandal. The Credit Mobilier
scandal involved prominent politicians who had accepted stock in a corporation organized to
divert profits from the Union Pacific Railroad. As a result of the scandal, the House of
Representatives censured two congressmen. Days after the censure vote, a nationwide ser-
vice of process provision, known as the Credit Mobilier Act, was tacked onto an appropria-
tions bill. See ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (1873) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 88 (.1976)).
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any one defendant was an inhabitant or where any part of the
cause of action arose.17 2 The House, however, imposed a three-year
time limit on the new jurisdictional power.173
The Credit Mobilier Act allowed the Attorney General to bring an equity suit against the
Union Pacific Railroad Company and other persons to compel payment for stock, collection
and payment of monies, and restoration of property to the railroad or to the states. The
venue and process provision of the Act 4 provided:
Said suit may be brought in the circuit court in any circuit and all said parties may
be made defendants in one suit. . . . The court where said cause is pending may
make such orders . . . and issue such process as it shall deem necessary to bring in
new parties or the representatives of parties deceased, or to carry into effect the pur-
poses of this act. . . . Writ [of subpoenas] shall run into any district, and shall be
served, as other like process, by the marshal .....
Credit Mobilier Act, ch. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509 (1873).
172. Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849. That amendment added a proviso to
the process and venue provisions of the Judicial Code of 1911, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231,
36 Stat. 1087, 1101. The amendment specifically addressed the problem of multiple defen-
dants in actions brought by the government, providing, in part:
[A]ny civil suit, action, or proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States, or
by or on behalf of any officer of the United States authorized by law to sue, may be
brought in any district whereof the defendant is an inhabitant, or where there be
more than one defendant in any district whereof any one of the defendants, being a
necessary party, or being jointly, or jointly and severally, liable, is an inhabitant, or in
any district wherein the cause of action or any part thereof arose; and in any such
suit, action, or proceeding process, summons, or subpoena against any defendant is-
sued from the district court of the district wherein such suit is brought shall run in
any other district, and service thereof upon any defendant may be made in any dis-
trict within the United States or the territorial or insular possessions thereof in which
any such defendant may be found with the same force and effect as if the same had
been served within the district in which said suit, action, or proceeding is brought.
Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42 Stat. 849, 849. The new statute was criticized by some
legislators as being too broad. See 62 CONG. REc. 12373 (1922) (statement by Rep. Jones
that language was "just as broad as the earth"). At least one court construed the broad
"cause of action" language as applying only to suits where there were multiple defendants.
In United States v. Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 30 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1929), an action brought
by the United States in the District of Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia quashed service of process made on a single defendant in California. Although the
1922 amendment addressed service of process, the "confessed general purpose of the bill
[was] to locate proceedings in the District of Columbia." 62 CONG. REC. 12369 (1922) (re-
marks of Rep. Moore). The companion act, Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 344, 42 Stat. 848,
provided nationwide service of subpoena for witnesses "upon proper application and cause
shown." 42 Stat. at 849.
173. See 62 CONG. REc. 12368-73 (1922). In recommending the limitation, one Repre-
sentative stated:
I suggest that this be limited to one or two or three years and that it be provided for
the Government's use alone in these war fraud cases. I accept the conditions, that the
Attorney General says the only way that he can do anything is in this way. I agree to
give him that temporary power, although it is violative of the very spirit of our
institutions.
Id. at 12372 (remarks of Rep. Wingo). The House also expressed concern over "the great
deal of prejudice against the power to take a man out of his state an unconscionable dis-
tance to be kept until the trial is over." Id. at 12368 (remarks of Rep. Parker). In the debate
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Like the war fraud amendment, the 1936 amendment to the
Judiciary Act dealing with stockholders' derivative actions 17  was a
response to a particular problem. 7 5 Although the amendment ex-
panded jurisdiction and venue in diversity actions, it again illus-
trates the lack of a uniform scheme for acquiring personal jurisdic-
tion in federal court. The 1936 amendment was prompted by the '
need to assert nationwide jurisdiction in stockholders' actions
brought to enforce rights of the subsidiary against the parent cor-
poration.176 Although the subsidiary and the parent corporations
were indispensable parties to such an action, both could not be
brought into federal court under the then-existing venue and juris-
diction provisions of the Judicial Code because a corporation was
considered a resident only of the state of its incorporation,7 and
the Judiciary Act permitted diversity suits only in the district
where the plaintiff or the defendant resided.1 78 State courts also
were precluded from entertaining those cases because it was pre-
sumed under the Pennoyer edict that state courts were powerless
to assert jurisdiction over nonresidents beyond their own bounda-
ries. 79 Because Congress believed it crucial that federal courts
have the ability to assert personal jurisdiction over corporate de-
fendants,180 it amended the Judiciary Act.81 The amendment pro-
on the amendment to enlarge the in personam jurisdiction of federal courts, nationwide
service of subpoenas on witnesses also was challenged. Representative Parker expressed
fears that courts would abuse that power: "It will be used in ordinary small civil cases. It is
one of the most dangerous powers in the world to allow a judge who wants to make a repu-
tation to summon all the big bankers of New York to attend his court." Id.
In 1925, the Department of Justice sought a three-year extension of the nationwide
service of process and venue provisions. 66 CONG. REC. 3910 (1925) (letter of Jerome
Michael, Director, War Transactions Section). Congress agreed to extend it for one year. Act
of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 526, § 1, 43 Stat. 1264. Nationwide service of subpoenas, however, was
extended for three years. Id. § 2, 43 Stat. at 1265.
174. Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940)).
The amendment is a distant antecedent of the contemporary jurisdiction statute. Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 945 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976)).
175. The avowed purpose of the amendment was "to plug a loophole in judicial proce-
dure" that effectively barred companies and subsidiary corporations from being sued in ei-
ther federal or state court in stockholders' suits. H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-
3 (1936). See.Act of Apr. 16, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940))
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976)).
176. H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
177. See, e.g., Seaboard Rice Milling Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pa. Ry., 270 U.S. 363, 366
(1926); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444, 453 (1892).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 337, 24 Stat.
552).
179. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
180. Congress cautioned that its legislative discretion to provide for nationwide pro-
cess was "based upon considerations of convenience to litigants, expense and promotion of
[1982: 285
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vided for process in any district "wherein such corporation resides
or may be found, ' 182 which was interpreted to encompass any-
where the corporation did business. 18 3 Thus, the amendment al-
lowed nationwide jurisdiction in stockholders' derivative actions.184
The 1922 and 1936 amendments to the Judiciary Act reveal
'that Congress considered two factors before providing for nation-
wide jurisdiction: (1) the right of federal courts to entertain cases
that deal with important federally created rights and remedies,
and (2) the need for federal jurisdiction where state adjudication is
unavailable. The reluctance to extend nationwide jurisdiction fur-
ther evidences congressional concern with the inconvenience of dis-
tant litigation.18 5 Where Congress suspected that a defendant
would be adversely affected, jurisdiction was curtailed even though
its need was evident. 86
justice." H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). In the House Report, Congress
observed:
The power of the Federal courts to maintain a suit cognizable under the judicial
power of the United States in any district and to issue process for service anywhere in
the United States is a matter of legislative discretion, controlled by Acts of Congress
based upon considerations of convenience to litigants, expense, and promotion of
justice.
Id.
181. Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49 Stat. 1213, 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 112
(1940)) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976)).'
182. Id.
183. E.g., Eastern Livestock Co-op Marketing Ass'n v. Dickenson, 107 F.2d 116, 118
(4th Cir. 1939); Clements v. MacFadden Publications, 28 F. Supp. 274, 275 (E.D. Tex. 1939);
Maisel v. Odyania Am. Shipping Lines, 18 F. Supp. 727, 727 (E.D.N.Y. 1937); Berman v.
Affiliated Enters., 17 F. Supp. 305, 305 (D. Maine 1936).
In 1948, the Act was am6nded again. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 945. The
words "resides or is found" were replaced by the phrase "is organized or licensed to do
business or is doing business." The changes were made so that the language of the statute
would be "more specific." H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Ses. app. A147 revisers' notes
(1947).
184. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 113, § 1695, 62 Stat. 945 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1695 (1976)).
185. H.R. REP. No. 2257, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1936). See supra note 180.
186. The 1789 Judiciary Act, as amended, was discontinued as a general jurisdiction
and venue statute when the Judicial Code was formally revised. See Act of June 25, 1948,
oh. 646, 62 Stat. 945 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1693, 1695 (Supp. V 1956-
63)). Several service of process and venue provisions of the 1789 Act were codified in the
revised Judicial Code. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1693 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June
25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1693, 62 Stat. 945). Section 1693 provides: "Except as otherwise provided
by Act of Congress, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another in any civil
action in a district court." Id. That statutory language cohtains the same concept and is
nearly identical to the language in the Judiciary Act. The revisers' notes indicate that sec-
tion 1693 was based on 28 U.S.C. § 112 (1940) (codifying Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, 49
Stat. 1213; Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 526, § 1, 43 Stat. 1264; Act of Sept. 19, 1922, ch. 345, 42
Stat. 849; Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 51, 36 Stat. 1101), thus suggesting that the statute
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B. Special Federal Jurisdiction Statutes
In addition to the general provisions of the Judiciary Act,
Congress has enacted a number of statutes that provide for federal
jurisdiction over particular subject areas.187 Rule 4 defers to those
statutes for determining the manner of serving process and amena-
bility to jurisdiction. 188 Federal jurisdiction statutes do not present
the same uncertainty in determining amenability that Rule 4 and
state long-arm statutes do.'8 9 Nevertheless, problems of uniformity
was a codification of the process provisions of the 1789 Judiciary Act, as amended. Judge
Clark, in Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), and in Arrow-
smith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 1963) (Clark, J., dissenting) (overrul-
ing Jaftex), also suggested that the present statute is a codification of the process and venue
provisions of the Judiciary Act. See supra note 19. Contra Note, Personal Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. Cni. L.
REV. 752, 759-60 (1964) (concluding that this provision is anachronistic). The most recent
case discussing the process and venue issues did not reach the defendant's contention that
section 1693 prohibited service of process on him. SEC v. Naftalin, 460 F.2d 471, 474-75
(8th Cir. 1972).
Section 1695, 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 1695, 62 Stat. 945), provides for process in stockholders' derivative actions. The lan-
guage of section 1695, permitting process on a corporation in any district "where it is organ-
ized or licensed to do business or is doing business," does not change the meaning of the
1936 amendment to the Judiciary Act, Act of Apr. 16, 1936, ch. 230, § 5, 49 Stat. 1213, 1214,
providing that process may be served "in any district wherein such corporation resides or
may be found," but merely reflects the construction given to "or may be found." Id. (em-
phasis added). See United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 807-08 (1948); Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 27P U.S. 359, 373 (1927) ("or may be found"
equated with the concept of doing or carrying on business).
Sections 1391(a) and (b), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a),(b) (1976) (originally enacted as Act of
June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 42 Stat. 945), set forth general venue provisions in diversity and
federal question cases. The 1948 revision substituted the synonym "reside" for "whereof he
is an inhabitant" only for clarity. Those sections were further amended in 1966, Act of Nov.
2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111, authorizing venue in a civil action in the district
where the claim arose. Special venue is often included as part of federal statutes. See supra
note 73.
187. See supra note 157.
188. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(7),(e), (f), (i). See supra note 17.
189. Although some of the statutes only define the method for serving process, they
are interpreted as permitting jurisdiction based on physical presence. See, e.g., Driver v.
Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Colby v. Driver, 444
U.S. 527 (1980). But see Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 871 (N.D. Cal. 1976). The
Kipperman court interpreted section 1391(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976), as describing the
mechanics of effective extra-territorial service of process but not as providing an amenabil-
ity basis for personal jurisdiction. Id. Section 1391(e) provides:
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof acting iii his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or
an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise pro-
vided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action
resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action
is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action.
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persist.
Special jurisdiction statutes are included as part of legislation
that sets forth both substantive federal law as well as provisions
for service of process, venue and amenability to jurisdiction for
those particular areas of law. Although such statutes vary in sub-
stance, the language describing jurisdiction is similar. The Securi-
ties Exchange Commission Act of 1934 contains a typical jurisdic-
tion provision:
The district courts of the United States, and the United States
courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits
in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any
criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act
or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action
to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or rules and
regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or
rules and regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or trans-
acts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other
district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the
defendant may be found .... ,9o
Like most special jurisdiction statutes, that statute intertwines ser-
vice of process, venue and the amenability basis. Process can be
served anywhere the defendant resides or is found and venue is
Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be
applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a
party.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and com-
plaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail
beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
The Kipperman court's interpretation was rejected in United States v. McAninch, 435
F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). The McAninch court held that "if the defendants have the
requisite 'minimum contacts' with the United States, there is jurisdiction over them in this
district." Id. at 244 (emphasis in original). See also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d Cir. 1972). In Leasco, the court held that Congress in-
tended section 27 of the Securities & Exchange Act to extend personal jurisdiction to the
full reach permitted by the due process clause. Therefore, the court found it unnecessary to
discuss the application of the state statute. The Leasco court based its conclusion, in part,
on its interpretation of the word "found" in the 1934 Securities Exchange Commission stat-
ute. Id. at 1340.
190. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (emphasis added).
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proper anywhere process can be effected. Amenability to jurisdic-
tion is based on two factors: (1) whether the defendant's activity
falls within the substantive parts of the statute, and (2) whether
the conditions for process are satisfied. Because process follows a
defendant, physical presence is part of the amenability basis. Fed-
eral courts have construed the service of process language as pro-
viding nationwide jurisdiction.' That construction accords with
the interpretation given to the identical language in the Judiciary
Act of 1789.192 Unlike the original Judiciary Act, however, Con-
gress' intent in the special jurisdictional statutes is to provide for
nationwide jurisdiction. 9 ' Recognizing possible problems of fair-
ness, those statutes provide nationwide jurisdiction only where a
defendant has committed an act which violates the substantive
part of the statute. 9 4 That requirement restricts the assertion of
nationwide jurisdiction to the particular federal question defined
in the statute.
Three factors may have persuaded Congress to grant nation-
wide jurisdiction for select substantive federal questions. First,
Congress may have been influenced by the importance of having
federal courts entertain cases involving federally created rights."95
A second factor may have been Congress' desire to give federal
agencies jurisdiction over federal law that they are investigating
191. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); Mariash v.
Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1139-40 (2d Cir. 1974); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D.
Md. 1971). In Mariash, the court noted that "[a]lthough the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 is hardly a model of precision, the statute does speak with atypical clarity in authoriz-
ing nationwide service of process." 496 F.2d at 1139-40. Cf. United States v. McAninch, 435
F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (construing process language of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) as
providing for nationwide personal jurisdiction).
192. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
193. See infra note 196. See generally 51 CONG. REC. 9415 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Floyd, discussing venue and process language of H.R. 15657, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914),
which eventually became the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1914)); 21 CONG. REc. 3146
(1890) (remarks of Sens. Reagan, Hoar and Vest, discussing the Senate version of the Sher-
man Act).
194. See Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974):
It is simply too late in the day to argue that Section 27 [of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934] does not authorize nationwide service of process on any individ-
ual named in the complaint, provided, of course, the complaint states a claim under
the 1934 Act.
Id. at 1142.
195. That factor can be inferred from the subject matter covered in the statutes. They
include: (1) agricultural pest control, 7 U.S.C. § 150dd(b) (1976); (2) Antitrust regulations,
15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 22, 25 1213(d) (1976); (3) investment regulations, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(a),
77vvv(b), 78aa, 79y, 80a-43, 80b-14 (1976); and (4) actions against state officers, 28 U.S.C. §
1391(e) (1976).
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and enforcing."' 6 A third factor may have been the need to resolve
federal disputes involving parties dispersed throughout the nation.
Although those factors may have influenced Congress to grant
nationwide jurisdiction for particular federal questions, they have
not been applied uniformly. Many federal statutes encompassing
important federal rights and remedies do not include jurisdiction
provisions.19 7 Similarly, federal agencies with as much responsibil-
ity for the enforcement of federal law as those granted nationwide
service have not been provided equal jurisdiction. 98 Finally, al-
196. For example, the legislative history of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 45-77 (1976 & Supp. 1981), suggests that nationwide service of process was pro-
vided to facilitate enforcement and regulation by that agency in federal courts. Report of
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, Pursuant to S. Res. 98, on Control of Cor-
porations, Persons and Firms Engaged in Interstate Commerce, S. REP. No. 1326, 62d
Cong., 3d Sess. 2761-62 (1913); H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937). The
House Report indicates Congress' intent to center the enforcement of Federal Trade Com-
mission subpoenas in one district court, thereby requiring nationwide personal jurisdiction.
In FTC v. Browning, 435 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1970), a proceeding was brought to enforce
a Federal Trade Commission subpoena. The defendant, served by mail in Pennsylvania,
argued that the District of Columbia court lacked personal jurisdiction on the ground that
section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act was merely a venue statute. The court, in
rejecting the defendant's argument, stated:
Such a construction would be contrary to the congressional purpose to endow the
Commission with broad powers of investigation and the authority to compel "attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses and the production of. . . documentary evidence
relating to any matter under investigation. . . from any place in the United States at
any designated place of hearing."
Id. at 99 (footnote omitted).
197. Nationwide service of process is not available in actions involving the following
federal rights: (1) civil rights, see Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 53 F.R.D. 116 (E.D.
Pa. 1971) (no implied grant of nationwide service under Civil Rights Act); (2) trademark
infringement, see Besuner v. Faberge, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 278 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (extra-territo-
rial service of process not authorized by the Lanham Trademark Act); AAMCO Automatic
Transmissions, Inc. v. Tayloe, 368 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (Lanham Trademark Act
contains no express or implied provision for extraterritorial iervice of process); (3) copy-
right, see Volk Corp. v. Art-Pak Clip Art Serv., 432 F. Supp. 1179, 1180-81 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (service must conform to New York long-arm statute because no nationwide service in
copyright cases); and (4) labor relations, see Central Operating Co. v. Utility Workers of
Am., 491 F.2d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 1974) (despite policy to provide federal forum for suits
against unions, Labor Management Relations Act does not authorize nationwide service).
198. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925) (refusing to permit
nationwide service of a subpoena in an enforcement proceeding under the Transportation
Act of 1920):
[N]o reason is suggested why Congress should have wished to compel every person
summoned either to obey the Board's administrative order without question, or to
litigate his right to refuse to do so in such district, however remote from his home or
temporary residence, as the Board might select. The Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion which, throughout thirty-eight years, has dealt in many different ways with most
of the railroads of the United States, has never exercised, or asserted, or sought to
secure for itself, such broad powers.
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though it is equally difficult to assert jurisdiction over dispersed
parties in private antitrust litigation, nationwide jurisdiction is
available only where the United States is the moving party.1 9
Recognizing the need for a uniform system, federal courts
have attempted to establish criteria for asserting personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases. Despite their efforts, they too have
been unsuccessful. The federal courts, hoping to protect defen-
dants from unfairness, either have restrictively construed the na-
tionwide service of process statutes200 or have limited their scope
by applying due process principles. However, in cases involving
both federal and state claims, a majority of federal courts now ex-
tend nationwide jurisdiction to pendent state claims, even though
the federal statute is not directly applicable to the state claims. 0 1
Their reasoning in doing so is that judicial economy outweighs the
lack of specific congressional authority to extend nationwide
jurisdiction.2 0 2
Id. at 666.
199. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (nationwide service of process for addi-
tional parties does not apply to private suits); Clayton Act, id. § 25 (nationwide service of
process does not apply to private suits). See also Season-All Indus. v. Merchant Shippers,
385 F. Supp. 517, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (nationwide service of process under section 2321, 28
U.S.C. § 2321 (1976), for orders and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission not
available in private suits between carriers).
200. By refusing to allow nationwide jurisdiction unless specifically set forth by stat-
ute, the courts claim to further the intent of Congress. In Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S.
487 (1971), the United States Supreme Court refused to imply that nationwide process
under section 1391(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976), applies to habeas corpus actions. The
Court reasoned that "the legislative history of that section is barren of any indication that
congress extended habeas corpus jurisdiction. That section was enacted to broaden the
venue of civil actions which could previously have been brought only in the District of Co-
lumbia. See H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 [1961]; S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 [19621." Id. at 490 n.4.
201. See, e.g., Robinson v. Penn Central Co., 484 F.2d 553, 555-56 (3d Cir. 1973);
Schwartz v. Eaton, 264 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1959); Klepper Krop, Inc. v. Hanford, 411 F. Supp.
276, 279-80 (D. Neb. 1976); In re Penn Central Sec. Litig., 338 F. Supp. 436, 438 (E.D. Pa.
1971); Emerson v. Falcon Mfg., Inc., 333 F. Supp. 888, 889-90 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Townsend
Corp. of Am. v. Davidson, 222 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.N.J. 1963). Contra Wilensky v. Standard
Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass 1964); International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union v. Shields & Co., 209 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F.
Supp. 851, 852-53 (E.D. Pa. 1958). But see Ferguson, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 11 VILL. L. REV. 56 (1965).
202. Several district courts denied pendent personal jurisdiction in the 1950's and
1960's, reasoning that Congress intended to limit nationwide service of process to particular
subject areas and persons. See, e.g. Parker v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 244 F. Supp.
267, 271 (D. Colo. 1956); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 236 F. Supp. 801, 804-05 (D.
Colo. 1964); Wilensky v. Standard Beryllium Corp., 228 F. Supp. 703, 705-06 (D. Mass.
1964); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Shields & Corp., 209 F. Supp. 145
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Lasch v. Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1958); United States v.
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Although federal courts have interpreted nationwide jurisdic-
tion statutes to reflect constitutional principles of fairness, 203 their
definitions differ from those used by Congress. Congressional defi-
nitions of fairness require that defendants be protected from un-
reasonable burdens of litigation imposed by nationwide jurisdic-
tion.204 Although those concerns are understandable, inconvenience
in terms of physical distance traveled has not been traditionally
protected by the Constitution.0 5
Federal courts have defined fairness by examining the defen-
dant's relationship with the forum.20 8 In examining that relation-
ship, they have adopted three constitutional approaches to acquir-
ing personal jurisdiction in federal question cases. Some federal
courts2 07 apply a territorial due process test, examining the suffi-
ciency of the defendants' contacts with the United States. 208 Other
courts determine whether a defendant has a sufficient nexus with
the forum state.20 9 To determine whether that nexus exists, some
federal courts apply state courts' territorial due process tests.
2 10
Krasnov, 109 F. Supp. 143, 147-48 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
203. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1979); United
States v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp.
909, 912-13 (D. Md. 1971).
204. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
205. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) ("[The State] does not acquire
that jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient
location for litigation"); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) ("It is
clear, therefore, that the 'fairness' standard imposed by Shaffer relates to the fairness of the
exercise of power by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of imposing the burdens of
litigating in a distant forum").
206. See Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 332-33 (7th Cir. 1979).
207. See United States v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (defen-
dant, Consul at the United States Embassy in Santo Domingo, served pursuant to section
1391(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976), which provides for nationwide process); Alco Standard
Corp. v. Benelal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (stock buyer seeking rescission of
purchase agreement successfully used Rule 4 and nationwide process provisions of Securities
Act to serve process on defendants, citizens and residents of Spain).
208. In United States v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court rea-
soned that a sufficient nexus was present with the United States because the defendants
were United States citizens employed by the United States. Id. at 244. In Alco Standard
Corp. v. Benelal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court examined the acts committed in
the United States because the court viewed the Securities Acts as national in scope. Id. at
24-25.
209. That analysis parallels the approach state courts are directed to take in determin-
ing personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945);
supra note 32.
210. See Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 873-74 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Thompson
v. Battle, 54 F.R.D. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1971); SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 749 (D. Md. 1968);
SEC v. VTR, Inc., 39 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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For example, in Kipperman v. McCone,211 personal jurisdic-
tion was based on a federal nationwide service of process statute21 2
and a state long-arm statute.2 13 Although the statutory require-
ments for personal jurisdiction under the federal statute were met,
the district court denied jurisdiction because the defendant had in-
sufficient contacts with the state.21 "4 The court found that the
plaintiff's claim of jurisdiction was based on:
only the most tenuous connection with the State of California. Cer-
tainly none of the defendants had the commercial or professional
relationship with the forum which typifies most of the relevant case
law. Moreover, the conduct of which [the plaintiff] complains, while
of paramount concern to all United States citizens, is primarly the
subject of federal law. The offending agencies are organized under
federal law, the alleged participants were federal employees, and
the rights allegedly invaded were primarily constitutional rights.
The only aspect of the case which is peculiarly forum-related is
that plaintiff experienced the emotional effect of the alleged activity
in California.2 15
The Kipperman court's due process analysis of the defendants' re-
lationship to the forum treated the federal jurisdiction statute the
same as a state statute, contrary to the intent of Congress. 216 In so
211. 422 F. Supp. 860 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (suit against federal officials for illegally open-
ing plaintiff's mail).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
213. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
214. 422 F. Supp. at 870-75.
215. Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
216. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 152 n.16 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. on
other grounds, Colby v. Driver, 444 U.S. 527 (1980). In Driver, the court of appeals refuted
the defendant's argument that section 1391(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976), concerned only
the mechanics for serving process and not amenability to personal jurisdiction. Relying on
authenticated, but unpublished, transcripts of the House Report, H.R. RP. No. 1008, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1960), the court established that section 1391(e) was intended to pro-
vide broader coverage than that allowed under Rule 4:
There are statutes which do, like the Antitrust Laws, the Sherman Antitrust Act,
under which you can bring a suit against defendants and serve them anywhere in the
United States, and of course under the Bankruptcy Act you can serve persons any-
where in the United States.
Now what you would have to do here it seems to me would be to provide for the
service that we discussed, namely, service upon the U.S. Attorney, service by mail
upon the Attorney General, and also service by mail anywhere in the United States
upon the officer or agent being sued.
That would take care of it because all that is necessary is for Congress to author-
ize service to be made outside of the District, and it is perfectly valid to do so.
Id. at 156 (citing Hearings on H.R. 10039 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2-4 (1960) (statement of Judge Maris)). Cf. Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909 (D.
Md. 1971). The Stern court rejected the argument that the nationwide process provisions of
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doing, the court failed to recognize that federal statutes provide
federal jurisdiction independent of state rules or statutes.
Other federal courts have taken an entirely different approach
by abandoning a due process test where a defendant is physically
present and served with process within the United States. In
Mariash v. Morrill,217 the court, holding the due process require-
ments inapplicable, stated:
It is not the State of New York, but the United States, "which
would exercise its jurisdiction over them [the defendants]." And
plainly, where, as here, the defendants reside within the territorial
boundaries of the United States, the "minimum contacts" required
to justify the federal government's exercise of power over them, are
present. Indeed, the minimum contacts principle does not, in our
view, seem particularly relevant in evaluating the constitutionality
of in personam jurisdiction based on nationwide, but not extraterri-
torial service of process. It is only the latter, quite simply, which
even raises a question of the forum's power to assert control over the
defendant.218
In Stafford v. Briggs,219 dissenting Justices Stewart and Bren-
the Security Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were subject to the same
due process assessment as state long-arm statutes:
Although defendants cite many cases supporting the "minimum contacts" theory, the
mistake in their approach lies in equating due process requirements as applied to
jurisdiction in a state court based on the state's long-arm statute, with jurisdiction in
a federal court pursuant to a federal statute which explicitly sets out the extent of
venue and jurisdiction the court may exert in a given case.
Id. at 912.
217. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974). In Mariash, the action was based on violations of
the Security Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The individual defen-
dants were served with process in Massachusetts, their state of residency, pursuant to the
nationwide process provisions of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). The Mariash court
relied on the decision in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir. 1972), where the alien defendants were served in England pursuant to Rule 4(i), and
personal jurisdiction was predicated on section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Upholding the defendants' amenability to jurisdiction, the Leasco court stated:
While Congress was doubtless thinking mainly in terms of exercising its power "to
provide that the process of every District Court shall run into every part of the
United States," use of the word "wherever", rather than "where" or "in which", dem-
onstrates an intention to authorize service on a defendant who can be "found" only in
a foreign country, and although the section does not deal specifically with in per-
sonam jurisdiction, it is reasonable to infer that Congress meant to assert personal
jurisdiction over foreigners not present in the United States to [sic], but, of course,
not beyond the bounds permitted by the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Id. at 1340 (citations omitted).
218. 496 F.2d at 1143 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
219. 444 U.S. 527, 545 (1980) (Stewart & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). In Stafford, the
majority refused to recognize the assertion of jurisdiction over federal officers served with
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nan expressed a similar view, stating:
The issue is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant to as-
sume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather
whether the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases before us
involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of
the United States. No due process problem exists. 220
The distinction federal courts make between defendants within the
United States and defendants outside those boundaries suggests
that they have misunderstood the relationship between federal ju-
risdictional statutes and due process. Both Rule 4 and the 1789
Judiciary Act provide for general jurisdiction based on a defen-
dant's physical presence. Unlike rule 4 and the Judiciary Act, how-
ever, the subject matter of federal jurisdictional statutes has a di-
rect connection with the forum. Therefore, a due process test is
unnecessary even if the defendant is physically served with process
while outside the United States.221
One imaginative federal court constructed a five-factor "fair-
ness" test.222 That test combines elements used to evaluate the
burdens on the defendant under jurisdiction with those used under
venue standards. The purpose of the fairness test is to ensure a
convenient federal forum. Some federal courts have declined to fol-
low that test, criticizing its failure to relate the central concerns of
fairness to the power theory of jurisdiction and viewing it as an
process within the United States pursuant to a nationwide jurisdiction provisions of section
1391(e), 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
220. 444 U.S. at 554.
221. See A.L.I. STUDY, supra note 80. In discussing a federal statute that proposed
worldwide process for dispersed parties in diversity of citizenship cases, see 28 U.S.C. §
2374(a) (1976), the authors of that study stated:
Process under this section is authorized to run wherever the authority of the United
States may lawfully reach. There is no good reason why process should be limited to
the territorial boundaries of the United States and immunize persons outside the
country who may properly be subjected personally to the jurisdiction of the United
States Courts.
A.L.I. STUDY, supra note 80, at 401. The A.L.I. Study only considered "the general power of
Congress to authorize service of process across state lines, not with possible limits on the use
of such power dictated by considerations of fairness embodied in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment." Id. at 437 n.1.
222. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The five factors are: (1) the extent of the defendant's contacts with the place the action is
brought; (2) the inconvenience to the defendant; (3) judicial economy, (4) the probable situs
of the discovery proceedings; and (5) the impact of the activity in question beyond the bor-
ders of the defendant's residence or business. Id. at 203-04.
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attempt to constitutionalize convenience factors.22
Some federal courts, recognizing that a due process analysis is
unnecessary, but being concerned with the burdens of litigation,
have suggested that the criteria used for venue or transfer of venue
provisions may be more appropriate.224 The difficulty with that ap-
proach, however, is that venue not only restricts the exercise of
nationwide jurisdiction but may prevent federal courts from hear-
ing a federal question case.2 25
Attempts by both Congress and federal courts to ensure that
federal jurisdictional statutes are fair has resulted in a lack of uni-
formity in acquiring personal jurisdiction in federal question cases.
Responsibility now lies with Congress to enact a well-planned fed-
eral jurisdiction scheme that is fair to defendants while meeting
the needs of the federal system. Such a scheme would combine
process and venue standards for all federal question jurisdiction.226
223. See Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979). In rejecting the five-
factor fairness test, the Fitzsimmons court stated:
We decline, however, to adopt these [fairness] factors as a test of whether an instance
of personal jurisdiction under Section 27 complies with the Due Process Clause. The
"fairness" measured by these factors does not relate to the fairness of the exercise of
power by a particular sovereign-the central concern of Shaffer and its predeces-
sors-but instead to the fairness of imposing the burdens of litigation in a particular
forum. As such, these factors are more appropriately used in applying 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a), which embodies the nonjurisdictional doctrine of forum non conveniens, and
we therefore decline to import them into a determination of the constitutionality of
exercises of personal jurisdiction.
Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
224. See Warren v. Boktim Resources Corp., 433 F. Supp. 1360 (D.N.M. 1977) (SEC
action). In Warren, the court stated:
Given the extra-territorial service of process provision in § 27, it is evident that so
long as venue is properly laid in the forum district for claims brought under the 1934
Act, it is not necessary that each defendant have personally engaged in acts or trans-
actions within the forum in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over him.
Id. at 1364. See also Thompson v. Battle, 54 F.R.D. 222 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
Using venue criteria as a means of limiting federal jurisdiction reflects Congress' prior
attempt to rely.on venue as a restriction on jurisdiction. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1
Stat. 73; supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text. Most federal jurisdiction statutes also
provide for special venue. See statutes cited supra note 157.
225. Recently, the United States Supreme Court held that in exceptional cases, venue
could be examined prior to personal jurisdiction to avoid a constitutional question. Leroy v.
Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1980). In Leroy, where jurisdiction and venue
were predicated on section 27 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, the United States Su-
preme Court stated that "when there is a sound prudential justification for doing so, we
conclude that act may reverse the normal order of considering personal jurisdiction and
venue." Id. at 180. The Court avoided a possible constitutional issue by finding that venue
was improper and dismissing the case. Id. at 181-82.
226. See A.L.I. STUDY, supra note 80. The A.L.I. Study stressed the necessary relation-
ship of nationwide process to proposed venue change for federal question subject matter
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Federal procedure then would provide a uniform source of personal
jurisdiction in federal question cases that would be coextensive
with the grant of federal question subject matter.
If Congress were to provide such legislation, it would be un-
necessary to apply a due process test in federal question cases. Be-
cause a defendant's actions would fall within the federal subject
matter area, a relationship among the defendant, the litigation and
the court would be established. Thus, a sufficient nexus would ex-
ist by virtue of the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction.
Any inconveniences caused by litigation in a particular forum
could be resolved under the federal transfer of venue statute.
Transfer of venue considerations would not interfere with federal
courts' rights to acquire or sustain jurisdiction because that analy-
sis compares the convenience of available alternative forums.2
V. CONCLUSION
Exploration of the methods for acquiring personal jurisdiction
under Rule 4 demonstrates a lack of uniformity in the federal
courts. Those diverse methods ignore the policies inherent in ac-
quiring personal jurisdiction in federal question cases and have re-
sulted in confusion, unreliability and nonuniformity. The present
personal jurisdiction framework is contrary to the intent of provid-
jurisdiction. Id. at 164-68. See also supra note 85. As part of a revision of the Judicial Code,
Congress proposed a statutory scheme that was, in essence, a codification of the 1969 A.L.L
Study. The proposed legislation provided for process and venue that was co-extensive with
the grant of federal question subject matter jurisdiction. See 119 CONG. REC. 16,678-82
(1973) (statement of Senator Burdick describing and comparing the Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion Act of 1973, §§ 1311-1315, S. 1876, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973), and the Federal Court
Jurisdiction Act of 1971, S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. (1971)). Compare Federal Court Juris-
diction Act of 1973 § 1314, S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1973) (general federal question
jurisdiction) with Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (venue and process provisions).
See supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Bertozzi v. King Louis Int'l, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1166, 1172-74 (D.R.I.
1976); Zorn v. Anderson, 263 F. Supp. 745, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Federal transfer of venue
provisions are contained in section 1404 of the Judiciary Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976).
For the text of section 1404(a), see supra note 73. The transfer of venue provisions in sec-
tion 1404(a) are basically a codification of historic forum non conveniens principles. In es-
sence, that doctrine provides that although jurisdiction may be proper, a court may, in its
discretion, decline to exercise jursidiction and dismiss the case because of severe inconve-
nience to a defendant. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (transfer of
venue differs from forum non conveniens because cases need not be dismissed). For a full
discussion of forum non conveniens, see A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35 (1962);
Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380 (1947); Blair, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1929).
See also Federal Court Jurisdiction Act of 1973, § 1314 S. 1876, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. (1976)
(incorporating transfer of venue statute for federal question subject matter jurisdiction).
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ing uniform federal procedures and often forecloses a federal fo-
rum from hearing federal question cases. Neither Congress nor the
federal courts have solved .the problems arising under Rule 4. By
failing to enact legislation that encompasses all federal questions,
Congress has left the field open to state statutory schemes. Federal
courts also have added to the uncertainty about personal jurisdic-
tion in federal question cases because of their disagreement on
whether and how state due process limits should be imposed.
Restrictions on personal jurisdiction should not prevent fed-
eral courts from hearing cases based on federally created law. In
developing personal jurisdiction standards, Congress should ex-
pressly provide that due process concerns have been satisfied once
subject matter jurisdiction is found.
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